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ABSTRACT 
 
Discomforting Neighbors:  
Emotional Communities Clash over “Comfort Women” in an American Town 
 
by 
 
Kai Reed Wasson 
 
 In this thesis, I consider how a controversy over a monument commemorating the 
suffering of victims of imperial Japan’s “comfort women” sexual slavery system erupted in 
Glendale, California, a small suburb of Los Angeles, in 2013. On its surface, public speakers 
and activists used the language of historiographical debate that questioned the types of 
historical evidence that can be considered legitimate and which interpretations are well-
founded. Yet, underneath the surface, this debate is less about history and more about 
conflicting group identities. First generation Japanese immigrants, motivated in large part by 
fear of discrimination and pride in being Japanese, took Glendale’s monument project as a 
threat against which fearful members of this diasporic community could rally. In other words, 
the monument could be used as a vehicle to build and strengthen a community of otherwise 
scattered individuals who feel in some sense endangered by the rising ride of critical sentiment 
against Japan for crimes committed over seventy years ago. In contrast, Korean Americans 
and Armenian Americans used the media attention the controversy attracted as an opportunity 
to demonstrate their authenticity as Americans by building the monument and framing it as a 
  vi 
symbol of Glendale residents’ cosmopolitan memory and courageous defense of women’s 
human rights.  
 I based this research on ten interviews I conducted in 2017 with people who were 
actively involved in either the project to install the Peace Monument in Glendale or who spoke 
in favor of or against that project at a special hearing the city council held on July 9, 2013 to 
assess the public’s opinion. In addition to the interviews, I reviewed the city’s records of their 
deliberations on whether to build the peace monument, with special attention given to video 
recordings in which city officials or members of the public discussed the matter. I similarly 
reviewed pertinent local and international newspaper articles mentioning Glendale and the 
actors involved with an eye toward the vocabulary such articles used to frame the controversy 
for local and international audiences. The information I gathered from these various sources 
form the corpus from which I formulate my take on how the controversy in Glendale unfolded 
and how we should situate it in the scholarship on Japanese nationalism and the continuously 
expanding “comfort women” redress movement.  
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 1 
Introduction 
“I find it very painful to recall my memories. Why haven’t I been able to lead a normal life, 
free from shame, like other people? When I look at old women, I compare myself to them, 
thinking that I cannot be like them. I feel I could tear apart, limb by limb, those who took away 
my innocence and made me as I am. Yet how can I appease my bitterness? Now I don’t want 
to disturb my memories any further. Once I am dead and gone, I wonder whether the Korean 
or Japanese governments will pay any attention to the miserable life of a woman like me.” 
~Kim Haksun, survivor, 1990 
 
 Since Kim Haksun’s first press conference in 1990, activism and controversy revolving 
around wartime sexual slavery within the Japanese empire has expanded beyond the territories 
where it occurred, most notably to the United States. So, too, have Japanese attempts to silence 
that conversation. While commemorative activities take on many forms, politically influential 
Asian and Asian American communities are increasingly embracing memorial-construction to 
raise awareness of the suffering of “comfort women,” a euphemistic term referring to women 
who were forced into the imperial Japanese military’s system of sexual slavery during the 
Second World War.1 When local activists propose building a “comfort women” memorial, the 
proposal invariably sparks controversy. Most vehemently opposed to these memorials are 
certain first-generation Japanese immigrants as well as the Japanese government, both of 
                                                 
1 Korean survivors in particular have taken offense to the continued use of the terms “comfort women” or “sex 
slaves” when referring to them, preferring halmŏni (grandmother) instead. However, “comfort women” is the 
most common term in English when referring to the historical system and the discourse attached to it. For 
legibility’s sake, I often use the term “comfort women,” though always with quotation marks to note the 
complications of that phrase. When referring to the women, I use “survivor” to emphasize the struggles they 
have contended with their entire lives.  
 2 
whom decry such memorials as misinformed, exaggerated, and malicious. Coinciding with an 
ever-outraged transnational public sphere is a powerful, historical revisionist backlash within 
Japanese society that seeks to sanitize Japan’s wartime past. The vast scope of the horror and 
suffering as recounted by survivors combined with the Japanese government’s recalcitrance 
has instigated a tremendous amount of social and historical research and popular discourse on 
the matter.2 Although scholarship on rightwing Japanese views and activism is expanding, little 
has been written on Japanese activists who are combating the transnational spread of “comfort 
women” commemoration and the inevitable criticism of Japan that accompanies it. This thesis 
contributes to broader conversations on Japanese nationalism, politicized historical memory, 
and the “comfort women” controversy by taking a deeper look at these activists and 
considering some of the motivations driving them to oppose something that seems to be, to 
much of the rest of the world, obviously the right thing to do.  
 As a case study on Japanese nationalist activism, I examine the controversy in 
Glendale, California over a “comfort women” memorial called the Peace Monument. Unveiled 
on July 30, 2013 and weighing in at 1,100 pounds of bronze and concrete, the Peace 
Monument’s design features a life-sized statue of a young teenage girl seated on a chair 
adjacent to another, empty chair (see image 1). While the few living survivors of this horrific 
chapter of human history are currently in their 90s, the statue’s youthful appearance is meant 
to reflect the age of these women at the time of their impressment into the imperial Japanese 
                                                 
2 See Lisa Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016); Maki Kimura, Unfolding the ‘Comfort Women’ Debates: 
Modernity, Violence, Women’s Voices (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Chunghee Sarah Soh, The 
Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2008); George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the 
Second World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jūgun ianfu (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shinsho, 1995).  
 3 
army’s prostitution system, according to the monument’s sculptors, Kim Sŏkyŏng and Kim 
Unsŏng.3 The figure of the girl is dressed in a hanbok, the typical clothes Korean girls wore in 
colonial Korea; and yet, her shoes are missing, her bare heels raised off the ground, her hair 
cut unevenly, all of which indicate experiences of abandonment, loss of self-determination, 
and victims’ severance from their families and country. Her hands are clenched into fists as 
they rest tensely on her lap, signifying victims’ resolve to demand justice. On the ground 
behind the statue is a mosaic of black gravel forming the girl’s shadow, but resembling the 
slumped body of an elderly woman, which represents the fragmented, shattered lives survivors 
have been suffering in silence. A butterfly in the middle of the black gravel symbolizes the 
hope that victims will be reincarnated into a better world, and the bird on the girl’s shoulder 
reflects the spiritual links between survivors and the deceased. Finally, the empty chair 
signifies forgotten and deceased victims and simultaneously functions as an open invitation for 
the monument’s 
viewers to join victims’ 
fight for justice. 
The idea for 
placing this monument 
in Glendale’s Central 
Park was introduced by 
Phyllis Kim through 
Glendale’s Korean 
                                                 
3 “Deciphering symbolism of girl statue,” in The Korea Times, September 6, 2016, 
http://www.koreatimesus.com/deciphering-symbolism-of-girl-statue/. 
Image 1: The Peace Monument, Glendale, California 
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sister city association. Kim is a resident of Glendale and the executive director of the Korean 
American Forum of California (KAFC), a human rights organization seeking to raise 
awareness of the history of “comfort women” and to frame it as a crime against humanity that 
Japan must honestly reckon with. However, once news broke that Glendale was considering 
building the Peace Monument, a flood of angry messages—mostly from Japanese email 
addresses and largely with identical content—inundated city councilmembers’ inboxes. The 
emails demanded that Glendale reject the proposal since the historical view presented by the 
monument was “false.” For example, one such letter argued that, based on a survey conducted 
by both the Japanese and South Korean governments, “there was no evidence proving 
participation [sic] and forcing [sic] nature of the Japanese government and the Japanese 
military other than former comfort women’s testimony.”4 Other such form emails emphasize 
that “comfort women” is an international dispute between the South Korean and Japanese 
governments, and so it is inappropriate for Glendale to interfere by hosting the monument.  
 Japanese protests were not entirely virtual. On July 9, 2013, Glendale’s city council 
held a public hearing during which members of the public could express their opinions on the 
proposal. Mostly comprised of first-generation Japanese immigrants, opponents to the proposal 
attended this hearing en masse, clearly forming a numerical majority in the room that day. 
While each speaker had only two minutes to make a statement, as a collective they presented 
the gamut of revisionist arguments aimed at obscuring what is, in fact, a broad international 
consensus on the nature of the wartime “comfort women” system as an instance of 
systematized sexual slavery and one of the largest cases of human trafficking in history. With 
                                                 
4 See appendix for the full letter. Taken from Yamamoto Yūmiko, “CA Gurendēru ianfu kinenhi hantai! 
Messēji,” July 7, 2012, accessed April 21, 2018, http://nadesiko-action.org/?page_id=3360. 
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the city council’s vote of 4-1 in favor of building the monument meant that anti-monument 
activists failed to prevent the monument’s construction. To avoid similar failures in the future, 
they took the opportunity to form an organization that could better manage their financial and 
human resources. Exploring the underlying social function of this organization, called the 
Global Alliance for Historical Truth (GAHT) and led by a man named Kōichi Mera, is one of 
the primary focuses of this thesis.  
The sort of grassroots Japanese nationalist activism of which GAHT is one instantiation 
did not, of course, appear in a vacuum. GAHT is an outgrowth of a neonationalist trend in 
Japan whose beginnings most scholars agree are rooted in the 1990s. A multitude of global 
forces converged in in that decade that raised relatively dormant questions in domestic and 
international discourse about Japan’s responsibility for past war crimes. Sociologist Hiro Saito 
and anthropologists Lisa Yoneyama and Nathaniel Smith attribute much significance to 
Emperor Hirohito’s illness and death in 1989 as one major factor that helps to explain Japan’s 
neonationalism.5 His death inspired broadcasting stations to air special media coverage on 
“Shōwa” (1926-1989) history. While mainstream media focused on the positive aspects of 
Hirohito’s reign, NGOs across Japan began organizing symposiums and seminars to consider 
critically his responsibility for the Asia-Pacific War, including for the atomic bombings in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.6 In 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a conservative party 
that had long held the reins of the government, was briefly ousted from power. The non-LDP 
politicians who came into power were more forthcoming in responding to Chinese and South 
                                                 
5 Hiro Saito, The History Problem: The Politics of War Commemoration in East Asia (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2017); Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins; Nathaniel Smith, “Right Wing Activism in Japan and the 
Politics of Futility,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2011).  
6 Saito, The History Problem, 74. 
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Korean NGOs, who were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands that Japan address its 
responsibility for previously unaddressed crimes. However, deep polarization within the 
Japanese government regarding WWII-related responsibility and the persistent influence of 
well-connected nationalist lobbying organizations undermined the government’s initial 
apologetic attitudes and reconciliatory gestures. The infighting fed into a revolution in 
nationalist activism. 
Characterizing Japanese neonationalism is the emergence of grassroots rightwing 
activists who emphasize their ordinariness by wearing regular clothes and working together 
with women.7 Their ordinariness in turn enables them to claim to represent the rest of Japanese 
society. Identifying and presenting themselves as “normal” differs from previous generations 
of rightwing activism in Japan, in which men clad in paramilitary garb were the only explicit 
participants.8 Furthermore, these earlier activists, whom Smith categorized as part of the “New 
Right” movement of the 1970s, consciously operated from a marginalized position, a dynamic 
he termed the “politics of futility.” He defined it as a nativist political disposition that conjures 
the stoic, often failed sacrifices of national martyrs and allows activists to place themselves 
among the pantheon of heroes. The aggressive style that underlies their activism, which often 
includes the projection of a threat of violence (punctuated with real acts of violence), also 
ensures their political and social isolation. Activists’ isolation, however, empowers them to 
maintain group cohesion, individual resolve, their sense of masculinity, and their identification 
with the Japanese ethnic nation (as opposed to the juridical state). In contrast, the neonationalist 
activists in GAHT claim to represent the whole of the Japanese nation and, rather than 
                                                 
7 Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yoko, Iyashi no nashonarizumu (Comforting Nationalism) (Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003). 
8 Smith, “Right Wing Activism in Japan and the Politics of Futility.” 
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projecting violence, maintain that they themselves are the “real” victims in the “comfort 
women” controversy.  
Typically credited as the intellectual founder of Japanese neonationalism is professor 
of education at Tokyo University, Fujioka Nobukatsu. He believed that the Allies had 
corrupted Japan’s history education system during the postwar occupation by forcing it to 
demonize everything Japan had done since the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In one of his many 
publications he wrote that:  
…the central problem consciousness [of this volume] is to convey that now when fifty years 
of postwar have elapsed, Japanese people do not have to be shackled to a view of their own 
nation’s history that has its origins in the national interests of foreign countries.9 
To combat what he derided as “masochistic” history and instead promote national pride, 
he founded in July 1995 the Liberal School of History (Jiyūshugi shikan kenkyūkai).10 To 
realize this organization’s historical views and vision of a proud Japan, he joined with other 
academics, novelists, and politicians to form the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform 
(Atarashii kyōkasho wo tsukurukai, hereafter “Tsukurukai”). Tsukurukai’s goal was, and 
continues to be, to produce middle school history textbooks that encourage children to have 
pride in Japan by erasing references to “comfort women,” the Nanjing Massacre, and other 
wartime atrocities Japan committed. Through a coordinated media campaign stoking rightwing 
anger against “masochistic” textbook publishers and the educational committees that decide 
                                                 
9 Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kingendaishi kyōiku no kaikaku: Zendama, akudama shikan wo koete (Reforming Modern 
History Education: Overcoming Good Guy, Bad Guy History) (Tokyo: Meiji Tosho, 1996), 2, cited from Rikki 
Kersten, “Neo-nationalism and the ‘Liberal School of History,’” Japan Forum 11:2 (1999): 191-203, 198. 
10 Ibid. 
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which book their districts would utilize, by 2004 Tsukurukai had succeeded in eliminating all 
mention of “comfort women” in government-approved textbooks.11 
 Another major figure and also former member of Tsukurukai is popular manga artist 
Kobayashi Yoshinori. While he was a member, in 1998 Kobayashi published his best-known 
work, Sensōron (“On War”). It features Kobayashi himself as the narrator and protagonist as 
he embarks on an introspective journey to realize the “truth,” that mainstream Japanese history 
is “distorted,” initially by the U.S. during the occupation, who were then joined by Japanese 
“lefties,” Chinese, and Koreans, all of whom seek to undermine the Japanese nation. 
Throughout this journey, Kobayashi retells the story of Japan’s participation in WWII through 
the lens of an unabashedly nationalistic framework. He addresses a range of the most 
contentious issues, including “comfort women,” the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, both atomic 
bombs, and the Nanjing Massacre, among others. In his treatment of each issue, he draws upon 
seemingly rigorous research to alter mainstream views, thereby inculcating the reader in 
revisionist Japanese history. In her interviews with contemporary generations of rightwing 
activists, anthropologist Tomomi Yamaguchi noted that many people cited Kobayashi’s manga 
as “one of the texts that most influenced them.”12 
 Yamaguchi terms neonationalist grassroots activists in Japan the Action Conservative 
Movement (ACM).13 This category encompasses those grassroots activist organizations that 
formed around the same time as the proliferation of the internet in the 2000s, most notably the 
Group That Seeks Recovery of Sovereignty (Shuken kaifuku wo mesazu kai) and the Citizens’ 
                                                 
11 Reiko Koide, “Critical New Stage in Japan’s Textbook Controversy,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 12:13 (2014): 
http://apjjf.org/2014/12/13/Koide-Reiko/4101/article.html. 
12 Tomomi Yamaguchi, “Xenophobia in Action: Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in Japan,” 
Radical History Review 117 (Fall 2013): 98-118. 
13 Ibid.  
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Group Refusing to Tolerate Special Rights for Koreans in Japan (Zainichi tokken wo yurusanai 
shimin no kai, hereafter Zaitokukai), establishd in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Such groups 
target and attempt to marginalize people of Korean and Chinese ancestry and other minority 
groups whom they consider to be threatening Japan.14 While they conduct demonstrations in 
public, they do not target passersby. Rather, they reach their true audience online, where videos 
of their demonstrations are shared thousands to hundreds of thousands of times. In addition to 
the ACM, in 1997 more establishment conservative organizations like the Association of 
Shinto Shrines (Jinja honchō) and the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association (Nippon 
izokukai), including many other new religious organizations like Happy Science (Kōfuku no 
kagaku), combined to form a powerful lobbying group called the Japan Conference (Nippon 
kaigi), which exerts much influence on the government’s reactions to overseas “comfort 
women” commemoration.  
Linking these wide-ranging and somewhat disparate organizations together is the 
common understanding that the “comfort women” controversy in particular poses a grave 
threat to Japan’s international reputation.15 More pragmatically, these groups are linked 
through a YouTube channel called Channel Sakura, which broadcasts news and talk shows that 
attract both mainstream and fringe reaches of rightwing Japanese individuals into a single 
media cyberspace.16 That Kōichi Mera, leader of GAHT, frequently appears on Channel 
Sakura to promote GAHT and its U.S.-based activism is one indication that Japanese 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Tomomi Yamaguchi, “The ‘History Wars’ and the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue,” YouTube video, 1:14:23, 
May 10, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2OFLzqP5KE&t=2452s. 
16 Ibid. 
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neonationalist activists living in the U.S. are oriented around the historical and political views 
espoused by Channel Sakura.  
Little scholarship has been published on “comfort women” commemorative activities 
in the United States. Most relevant to the content in this thesis are two books. One is a small 
edited volume written in Japanese by Tomomi Yamaguchi, Motokazu Nogawa, Tessa Morris-
Suzuki, and Emi Koyama, whose title translates to The “Comfort Women” Problem Crosses 
the Ocean: Interrogating Rightists’ “History War” (Umi wo wataru ‘ianfu’ mondai: Uha no 
‘rekishisen’ wo tou). Its four chapters center on the Japanese government’s persistent attempts 
to quash international discourse on comfort women, the rise of various rightwing organizations 
and alliances in Japan, and theorizing apology and redress.17 Koyama’s chapter in this volume 
provides the most extensive account of Kōichi Mera’s personal history and involvement in 
Japanese historical revisionism, though her attention remains on him and the Japanese 
government’s (failed) attempts to prevent San Francisco from building a “comfort women” 
memorial.18  
The other scholarly work on “comfort women” commemoration in the U.S. is Elizabeth 
Son’s Embodied Reckonings: “Comfort Women,” Performance, and Transpacific Redress.19 
In this book she examines various national and transnational commemorative activities 
dedicated to “comfort women,” including the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, 
the Wednesday Demonstrations in Seoul, stage productions, and monument construction in the 
                                                 
17 Yamaguchi Tomomi, Nogawa Motokazu, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, and Koyama Emi, Umi wo wataru ‘ianfu’ 
mondai: Uha no ‘rekishisen’ wo tou (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016).  
18 Koyama Emi, “Amerika ‘ianfu’ hi secchi he no kōgeki,” in Umi wo wataru ‘ianfu’ mondai: Uha no 
‘rekishisen’ wo tou, eds., Yamaguchi Tomomi, Nogawa Motokazu, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, and Koyama Emi 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2016), 42-68.  
19 Elizabeth Son, Embodied Reckonings: “Comfort Women,” Performance, and Transpacific Redress (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2018). 
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United States. She argues that survivors’ participation in commemorative activities, producing 
materials that will perpetuate an element of their memories and experiences long after they 
themselves pass away, and working toward a more peaceful future gives their lives meaning 
far more powerful than whatever the Japanese government could provide in the form of 
apologies and reparations. Son’s important book provides the most thorough accounting of 
“comfort women” memorial-building in the U.S. and their intersection with survivors’ own 
personal desires concerning the redress movement. However, her concentration is not on those 
who oppose these commemorative activities. Therefore, this thesis contributes to this 
burgeoning scholarship by focusing less on the leadership of Japanese historical revisionist 
organizations and instead considers the more rank-and-file members who take time out of their 
day to face public censure and speak out against something they find personally threatening.  
 I center my analysis primarily on the controversy that took place in Glendale, California 
beginning in 2012 for several reasons. First, Glendale was the first municipality outside of 
South Korea to host a replica of the “comfort women” memorial built in Seoul, directly across 
the street from the Japanese Embassy, called the “Girl Statue of Peace” (Pyŏnghwaui 
sonyŏsang). As such, along with Glendale being in a region where an abundance of expatriate 
Japanese, Japanese Americans, Korean Americans, and many other diverse communities 
reside, Glendale garnered a remarkable amount of domestic and international media attention. 
Second, the most influential Japanese activist networks in the U.S. engaged in combating the 
spread of these memorials established themselves in the wake of Glendale’s adamant refusal 
to acquiesce to their appeals. While the first “comfort women” memorial in the U.S. was a 
small commemorative stone and plaque built in 2010 in Palisades Park, New Jersey, grassroots 
mobilization against such memorials first took shape in the context of Glendale. These factors 
 12 
make Glendale a productive case study that speaks to the sorts of individuals who participate 
in anti-commemoration activism, their tactics, and the underlying sociality that revisionist 
organizations like GAHT can provide its members.  
On the surface, this controversy was about how the horrific experiences of women who 
fell victim to the “comfort women” system should be interpreted in the present. It variously 
addressed questions about how the system operated, who should bear responsibility for it, and 
how that responsibility should be demonstrated. While the historiography of the comfort 
women system and how to properly acknowledge it today might well belong to the most widely 
studied singular phenomena of the Asia-Pacific War, scholarship hardly figures in this public 
and transnational debate. Saito describes Japan’s “history problem” not as a debate on 
historiography, but rather as an “emotionally charged disagreement between the governments 
and citizens in [Japan and South Korea] over how to construct autobiographical narratives as 
foundations of their national identities.”20 Iwasaki Minoru and Steffi Richter, writing about 
historical revisionism in Germany and Japan, characterize revisionism as a fundamentally 
emotional and largely fear-driven behavior that has little to do with rigorous standards of 
history-writing. As an intensely emotional topic, my approach to Glendale’s case is influenced 
by two analytic concepts in which emotion is central.  
One of these critical lenses is art historian Erika Doss’s notion of the affective lives of 
monuments. She argues that American society is embroiled in what she calls “memorial 
mania,” an obsession with issues of memory and history and an urgent desire to express and 
claim those issues in visibly public contexts.21 According to Doss, commemorative cultures in 
                                                 
20 Saito, The History Problem, 6.  
21 Erika Doss, Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010).  
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the U.S. aim to evoke intimate, emotional, and authentic ties between different American 
publics and the U.S. as a whole, thereby encouraging an affective allegiance to the nation that 
would be as strong and as sacred as that extended to family, region, religion, and other 
ethnic/racial groups.22 In this contemporary context, monuments function as “memory 
vectors,” that is, bodies of feeling and cultural entities whose social, cultural, and political 
meanings are determined by—and also structure—the emotional states and needs of their 
audiences.23 The community-building effects of Glendale’s Peace Monument are undeniable, 
as will be apparent in the chapters that follow. However, since the monument in Glendale sits 
at the intersection of domestic, international, and transnational forces, widely divergent 
readings of the Peace Monument’s meaning have deepened certain intercommunal divisions 
as well as connections. Along those lines, I argue that the monument serves as an emotionally 
charged conduit of identity politics that actors engage in within local, international, and 
transnational contexts. 
The other concept I draw from is Barbara Rosenwein’s “emotional communities.” For 
Rosenwein, emotional communities are bounded in much the same way as any social 
community—families, neighborhoods, parliaments, churches—but are held together and 
organized by the repertoire of emotional expressions individuals experience and communicate. 
Such emotions are shaped by the cultural norms of the community. Furthermore, emotional 
communities overlap with one another, and individuals move among them more or less 
successfully based on their knowledge of the “modes of emotional expression that [these 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 25.  
23 Ibid., 46.  
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communities] expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.”24 Rosenwein developed this concept 
as a historian trying to recover the emotional lives of medieval Europeans. While the original 
context of her term is a far cry from twenty-first-century California, I aim to demonstrate that 
it is nevertheless an appropriate and productive conceptualization regarding the “comfort 
women” controversy in Glendale.  
Japanese anti-monument activists in particular fail repeatedly to convince local city 
councils to avoid becoming involved in an “international dispute.” They also inadvertently 
inspire additional communities to build more monuments to spite Japanese protestors. 
Considering why these people would persistently face public censure despite the apparent 
futility of their actions and the consistently negative responses they receive is the core question 
this thesis seeks to address. Combining an understanding of Glendale’s Peace Monument as 
an emotional entity as well as a site in which differently oriented communities emotionally 
clash opens a window into the anxieties at the root of the local controversy. Doing so also 
allows me to consider these communities’ turn to nationalism to allay collective anxieties, 
despite the transnational flow of information, cooperation, and increasingly popular 
identification with the victims of the “comfort women” system on a universal human level.  
In the following chapters, I argue that the controversy about the monument in Glendale 
has served as an emotional conduit through which activists pull new participants into the debate 
via what may appear to be historical arguments, but which I suggest are grounded far more in 
emotion than in historiographical standards. These emotional appeals are based either on a 
deeply sanitized national past or the invocation of universal human rights. Ultimately, 
                                                 
24 Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” The American Historical Review 107:3 (June 
2002):821-845, 842.  
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however, my research suggests that nationalist identity persists even among pro-monument 
individuals advocating for universal human rights. Further, that most participants in this debate 
are people who did not themselves directly experience WWII and who in many cases have 
never resided in the territories where the “comfort women” system operated speaks to the 
transnational scope of this project even though its primary site being in Glendale.  
The first chapter examines local media coverage of three “comfort women” 
controversies in American locales: Palisades Park, New Jersey in 2012; Glendale, California 
in 2013; and San Francisco, California in 2017. In each case, Japanese resistance followed 
consistent patterns, as did local responses. At first, local representatives of the Japanese 
government approach the city council responsible for permitting the construction of “comfort 
women” memorials in public space with requests that the memorial be removed. Their 
reasoning invariably is that the memorial’s historical narrative is incongruent with the Japanese 
government’s stance, and that such memorials risk harming U.S.-Japan relations. In 
conjunction with the Japanese government’s actions, Japanese activists organize email 
campaigns that flood city councilmembers’ inboxes with messages demanding the memorial’s 
removal from public space. With the exception of Palisades Park, since it first occurred before 
such commemorative activities became so controversial, each time a local community 
considers building a “comfort women” memorial, nearby Japanese residents of the U.S. attend 
city council meetings in force to present various historical arguments implying the illegitimate 
historical basis for “comfort women” commemoration and their criticisms of the Japanese 
government. However, oppositional activism tends to not only fail to persuade communities to 
remove their memorials, it actually convinces other communities to build their own “comfort 
women” memorials. The repetition of this dynamic raises the question of why oppositional 
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activists would continue to use the same tactics despite them being obviously counter-
productive.  
Chapter Two describes Glendale, the local arena for the main controversy I focus on, 
with the purpose of explaining why these passion-fueled events unfolded in a town often 
described by residents as “boring.”25 The most significant factor about Glendale for this thesis 
is that it is home to a politically active Armenian American community. This factor is important 
because the diasporic Armenian community has long struggled within the United States for 
official recognition of their own victimhood in the Armenian Genocide, which made it more 
attuned to Korean Americans’ similar claims to historical and continued victimhood by a 
reticent government denying its responsibility to provide redress. I also consider why certain 
Japanese members of this community reacted differently to this commemorative project than 
every other community.  
Chapter Three begins my examination of arguments presented at a special public 
hearing that Glendale’s city council held on July 9, 2013 regarding the proposal for the Peace 
Monument. I specifically center on Japanese opponents to the project and frame them as an 
emotional community anchored in an intense identification with Japanese neonationalism and 
held together by shared experiences of fear. I also address in this chapter the subjective, 
emotional foundations of “truth,” especially “historical truth,” which applies to both the 
monument’s opponents as well as its supporters, who I address in the following chapter.  
In Chapter Four, I similarly describe supporters of the monument project as an 
emotional community, but one that is anchored in an identification with human rights and 
                                                 
25 Brittany Levine, “Glendale to get ‘animated’ in image makeover,” in the Los Angeles Times, November 30, 
2011, accessed March 5, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/tn-gnp-1130-glendale-to-get-animated-in-image-
makeover-story.html. 
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victims of atrocities anywhere at any time in history. I argue that the convergence of the 
transnational movement to establish a women’s human rights regime with the “comfort 
women” redress movement helped make such redress activism in Glendale appear intimately 
relevant to the city’s leadership. However, I also argue that, despite the transnational 
orientation of this particular emotional community, support tends to remain in the domain of 
symbolism. The primarily symbolic mode of these events serves as one example of how 
activists and politicians globally have politicized human rights rhetoric to a degree that such 
rhetoric is used mostly for partisan inter- and intranational identity politics.  
I based this research on ten interviews I conducted in 2017 with people who were 
actively involved in either the project to install the Peace Monument in Glendale or who spoke 
in favor of or against that project at the public hearing on July 9, 2013. Such individuals include 
Kōichi Mera, leader of the Global Alliance for Historical Truth (GAHT)—the group dedicated 
to opposing comfort women commemoration—and several members of that organization. I 
spoke with Phyllis Kim, director of the Korean American Forum of California (KAFC), who 
is the single person most responsible for Glendale’s Peace Monument project. I interviewed 
Zareh Sinanyan, who was at the time and continues to be a city councilmember, and Dan Bell, 
who is the Community Relations Coordinator for Glendale and the person who manages the 
city’s various sister city relationships. I also spoke with several prominent Japanese Americans 
who are leading figures in the Southern California branches of two organizations: the Nikkei 
for Civil Rights and Redress (NCRR) and the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). In 
addition to the interviews, I reviewed the city’s records of their deliberations on whether to 
build the peace monument, with special attention given to video recordings of public hearings 
in which the matter was discussed. I similarly reviewed pertinent local and international 
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newspaper articles mentioning Glendale and the actors involved. The information I gathered 
from these various sources form the corpus from which I formulate my take on how the 
controversy in Glendale functioned and how we should situate it in the continuously expanding 
redress movement across the United States.  
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Chapter One—Persistence Despite Futility: Japanese Anti-Monument 
Activists in American Media 
 
Each time Japanese activists or representatives of the Japanese government intervene 
in local deliberations to force the removal of a commemorative project dedicated to “comfort 
women” in the United States, they inadvertently inspire other communities to build more 
memorials. Commemorative activism for “comfort women” in the U.S. began in 2007, when 
grassroots Korean American activists organized to lobby the House of Representatives to pass 
a nonbinding resolution that would call on Japan to apologize for sexually enslaving women 
during WWII. Coinciding with the first administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, whose 
revisionist views are well known, dozens of Japanese politicians and opinion leaders attempted 
to preempt the American resolution by placing a full-page public comment in the June 14, 2007 
issue of the Washington Post entitled “The Facts,” which denied the historical basis of the 
redress movement. The House of Representatives then passed the “comfort women” resolution 
(HR 121) unanimously. Between Abe’s resignation in 2007 and his reelection in 2013, the 
Japanese government took greater precaution when voicing its concerns. However, this 
precaution has since faded, and the apparent futility in directly confronting local governments 
across the U.S. has done little to deter grassroots Japanese nationalist activists.  
Why would Japanese activists continue to engage in the same heavy-handed tactics 
even though they tend to be remarkably counterproductive? This question emerges out of a 
broad examination of news reporting on the controversies each time an American community 
constructs a memorial dedicated to “comfort women.” In the cases I review in this chapter, 
Japanese activists, mostly first-generation immigrants, took direct action to prevent a 
memorial’s construction or to have it removed once it had already been installed. In each case, 
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I outline how local English-language news sources characterized the stakes of the controversy 
to extrapolate how local communities reacted to Japanese opposition. I then chart the 
remarkable consistency of this dynamic across the examples of Palisades Park (New Jersey), 
Glendale (California), and San Francisco (California) to raise the question as to why 
oppositional activists appear to only commit more passionately to their seemingly 
counterproductive tactics.  
Palisades Park, New Jersey 
The first memorial dedicated to “comfort women” was installed in 2010 in Palisades 
Park, New Jersey, a small town just outside New York City with approximately 20,000 
residents, nearly half of whom are ethnically Korean.26 The idea for this memorial came from 
Chejin Park, an attorney working for an organization called Korean American Civic 
Empowerment (KACE). Founded in New York in 1996 and then again in New Jersey in 2000, 
KACE is dedicated to “empowering and mobilizing the Korean American community to take 
action locally, nationally, and internationally to address concerns of the community.”27 Park 
noticed one day at the county’s courthouse in Hackensack a group of African Americans 
attending a ceremony for a memorial to the history of slavery in the United States.28 He relayed 
to journalists that he noticed this slavery memorial was positioned alongside other memorials 
dedicated to the Irish famine, the Holocaust, and the Armenian Genocide.29 He believed 
                                                 
26 U.S. Census Bureau, “ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2012-2016 American Community Survey 
5-Year Estimates,” accessed April 11, 2018, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF 
27 Korean American Civic Empowerment, “Mission & Goals,” accessed April 11, 2018, 
http://us.kace.org/about-us/mission-goals/. 
28 Samantha Henry, “Tensions linger in US over ‘comfort women’ plaques,” The San Diego Tribune, January 
30, 2013, accessed April 11, 2018, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-tensions-linger-in-us-over-
comfort-women-plaques-2013jan30-story.html. 
29 Elizabeth Son, Embodied Reckonings: Memorial Building in the Korean Diaspora (Ann Arbor, MN: 
University of Michigan Press, 2018), 162. 
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placing a memorial dedicated to “comfort women” among these other memorials would further 
associate it with human rights, which would in turn contribute to the Korean American 
awareness-raising that had begun with House Resolution 121. Over the course of one year, 
after gathering over one hundred signatures for a petition to build a memorial and giving 
historical presentations to the Palisades Park city council, that town unveiled the first “comfort 
women” memorial in the U.S. 
Located on the grounds of the town’s public library, the memorial consists of a block 
of gray stone with a bronze plaque depicting an outline of a soldier about to strike a crouching 
woman with his hand. The plaque reads: 
In memory of the more than 200,000 women and girls who were abducted by the armed forces 
of the government of Imperial Japan 1930s - 1945 known as comfort women, they endured 
human rights violations that no peoples should leave unrecognized. Let us never forget the 
horrors of crimes against humanity. 
By framing the history of “comfort women” as a “human rights violation” and a “crime 
against humanity,” it reflects Park’s initial desire to avoid the issue’s potential dismissal as 
only a specific Korean grievance against Japan. However, given the remarkably high 
percentage of Palisades Park’s ethnic Korean population, local media coverage of the 
memorial’s unveiling focused heavily on the role of Korean American activism in this project. 
And yet, in highlighting activists’ logic behind building this memorial, they simultaneously 
emphasized the history’s framing as a Korean grievance, as well as a matter of human rights 
and a crime against humanity.  
 Local newspapers, notably The Record, based in Hackensack, N.J., Palisades Park’s 
neighbor and the county seat, presented a broad sense of unification throughout New Jersey 
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and New York City in their reports on this memorial. For example, Elizabeth Llorente’s “Pain 
of Wartime Crimes Lingers” includes statements by Steve Cavello, the local artist who 
designed Palisades Park’s memorial. After realizing the seriousness and, indeed, 
contemporariness of this history when he visited the House of Sharing in South Korea, which 
is a home built specifically for survivors in 1992, he stated that the survivors “don’t want to 
let it rest, so we’ll help them let people know this is a part of history.”30 Monsy Alvarado, also 
in The Record, reported on a locally-held press conference where two Korean survivors, Ok-
seon Yi (84) and Yongsoo Lee (83), along with two unnamed Holocaust survivors, were in 
attendance. She notes the local artists involved in promoting these events, including Cavello 
and Shinyoung An from nearby Cliffside Park, who had held an art exhibit and reception in 
Queens, N.Y. earlier that week.31 Framed as a human rights issue akin to the Holocaust, broad 
community support for the memorial and related commemorative events is presented as a 
natural response to learning about the history of the “comfort women” and their unanswered 
demands for justice.  
 Conversations on the memorial proliferated once the Japanese government took notice. 
In 2012, Kirk Semple from The New York Times reported that two delegations from the 
Japanese government paid a visit to Palisades Park.32 The first delegation provided two 
documents to Mayor James Rotundo, who was an ardent supporter of the project from the 
                                                 
30 Llorente, Elizabeth, “Pain of Wartime Crimes Lingers,” The Record (Hackensack, NJ), October 9, 2010: A01 
accessed April 18, 2018, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/132CC757413FEE58?p=AWNB. 
31 Monsy Alvarado, "UNCOMFORTABLE SILENCE," The Record (Hackensack, NJ), December 16, 2011: 
L01, accessed April 18, 2018, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/13BAE83066FD4708?p=AWNB. 
32 Semple, Kirk. “In New Jersey, Memorial for ‘Comfort Women’ Deepens Old Animosity,” The New York 
Times, May 18, 2016, accessed April 11, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/nyregion/monument-in-
palisades-park-nj-irritates-japanese-officials.html?_r=0. 
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beginning.33 One was a copy of the 1993 “Kōno statement,” which contains the Japanese 
government’s first official acknowledgement that imperial military authorities were vaguely 
involved in the “comfort women” system. The other document was a letter written by former 
Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi in 2001 apologizing to survivors for their treatment during 
the war. The delegation then requested that the memorial to “comfort women” be removed, 
and that the Japanese government would donate some cherry trees and some books for the 
public library “to show that we’re [Japan and the U.S.] united in this world and not divided.”34 
Mayor Rotundo and Deputy Mayor Jason Kim expressed their shock and disbelief at the 
request. Semple’s article also featured statements from the previously-mentioned Chejin Park, 
New York councilman Peter Koo, and the executive director of the Korean-American 
Association of Greater New York, Paul Park, all of whom expressed confusion at the Japanese 
requests and enthusiastic support for continuing commemorative activities along the same 
lines.  
  The delegations’ requests backfired by provoking local outrage. “They’re helping us, 
actually,” said Chejin Park, since the controversy functions to increase awareness of the 
issue.35 His assumption, while evidently accurate, reflects the extent to which residents in and 
around Palisades Park, regardless of ethnicity, were virtually unanimous in their support of 
human rights, and that the “comfort women” redress movement should be aided by any who 
support human rights. Reporters from The Record reinforced this sentiment. Alvarado quoted 
Mayor James Rotundo’s response as representative of the community’s reactions at large: 
“[The Japanese delegates’] purpose was to have us pretty much remove it. Regardless of 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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whatever else they said their main goal was, to come here to think we would be intimidated to 
take it away, and we are not.”36 While the Japanese consulate in New York denied that such 
an offer was made to Mayor Rotundo, incendiary reports on the request to have the monuments 
removed clearly motivated other nearby communities to push for more memorials. Internal 
disagreement among supporters regarding the specific design and wording of the memorials 
has delayed their progress, yet deliberations on these projects continue to this day, such as 
those in Fort Lee, New Jersey.37   
Glendale, California 
 Despite a drastically different ethnic composition and a far larger residential population 
than Palisades Park, local media representation of the controversy in Glendale differs little 
from the case in New Jersey. Descriptive reports as well as editorials and opinion pieces 
consistently framed the matter of “comfort women” as a human rights issue, that Japan should 
be more forthcoming in taking responsibility for it, and that it was perfectly appropriate for 
American communities to commemorate atrocities that occurred elsewhere. Compared to 
Palisades Park, however, in Glendale Japanese opposition was more prevalent, organized, and 
persistent, but nevertheless represented as so backwards as to be confusing.  
Glendale was the first city outside of South Korea to host a replica of the original 
monument in Seoul, which is officially called the “Girl Statue of Peace” (Korean original, 
Pyŏnghwaui sonyŏsang), though it is more often simply called the “girl statue” (sonyŏsang). 
Like reporting on Palisades Park’s own controversial memorial, in Glendale the history 
                                                 
36 Monsy Alvarado, "HISTORICAL TUG-OF-WAR," The Record (Hackensack, NJ), May 10, 2012: A01, 
accessed April 18, 2018, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/13EAF5699891F290?p=AWNB. 
37 Michael W. Curley, Jr., “Comfort Women memorial moving forward in Fort Lee,” NorthJersey.com, 
December 17, 2017, accessed April 18, 2018, https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/bergen/fort-
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commemorated by and embodied in the monument is portrayed in the news media as a human 
rights issue that should transcend ethnicity or nationality. Chang Lee, a member of Glendale’s 
Korean Sister City Association, said “it’s not about one ethnicity against one ethnicity. It’s 
about human rights. [The monument is] here so this atrocity will not be repeated. I’m glad that 
Glendale has taken a bold step to do that.”38 Before a pre-reception crowd at the monument’s 
unveiling, Councilmember Laura Friedman remarked that “we stand on the side of history. We 
stand on the side of truth. [The monument] stands to honor and recognize the innocent victims 
of all wars.”39 As an expression of support for this project, four of the five city councilmembers 
appealed to the concept of human rights and the need to band together to make sure the world 
never forgets an atrocity like this.40  
In addition to statements made by city councilmembers and the monument’s 
proponents, most English-language media coverage also framed the issue as an egregious 
violation of human rights. Realizing that most Americans and, in fact, English-speaking 
audiences in general, know little to nothing about the Japanese military’s sexual slavery during 
WWII, the history and victimization the monument commemorates had to be summarized 
frequently and concisely. Nearly every article published in English explained that “comfort 
women” refers to the over 200,000 Asian women who were taken as sex slaves for the Japanese 
military during the war.41 The most common descriptive points are the “200,000” estimate and 
                                                 
38 Brittany Levine, “Statue honoring WWII sex slaves comes to Glendale,” Glendale News-Press, June 26, 
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memorial,” Los Angeles Daily News, July 9, 2013, accessed April 16, 2018, 
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the term “sex slaves” or “sexual slavery,” both of which are the primary points of contention 
for the Japanese government and a vocal contingent of the diasporic Japanese community 
living across the U.S.  
Such dissenting voices are more present in the reporting on Glendale compared to 
Palisades Park. However, they are framed in a manner that suggests their unreasonableness. 
For example, a National Public Radio article by Aaron Schrank on the Glendale controversy 
describes how, in the weeks leading up to the July 9, 2013 public hearing on the proposal, 
hundreds of emails from Japanese addresses flooded into city councilmembers’ boxes angrily 
demanding that they vote against the proposal.42 “The tone of probably 98 percent, 99 percent 
of the email was total denial,” councilmember Frank Quintero said.43 “Not just of the comfort 
women issue, but the Rape of Nanking and all of the other atrocities. They are in total denial.”44 
In addition to the emails, however, many Japanese nationals residing throughout southern 
California attended the city council meeting, forming an overwhelming majority presence in 
the chambers, where they recited a variety of Japanese nationalist talking points, which I 
analyze in more detail in Chapter Three. Schrank quotes Kōichi Mera, a man who would 
eventually file a lawsuit against the City of Glendale, to substantiate Quintero’s remarks about 
Japanese denials: “The story told by Koreans is not based on the fact[s]. It’s a kind of, say, 
manufactured story.”45 The author also quoted Yoshi Miyake: “These girls were allowed to 
refuse customers if they want to. You call this sex slave?”46 Schrank immediately dismisses 
                                                 
42 Aaron Schrank, “Statue Brings Friction over WWII Comfort Women to California,” National Public Radio, 
July 29, 2013, accessed April 16, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2013/07/29/206655160/statue-brings-friction-over-
wwii-comfort-women-to-california. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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these arguments as “flying in the face of the evidence” to alert readers as to the absurdity of 
such claims.47 
But, even when journalists do not directly write off such assertions, they tend to 
position opponents’ statements around the middle of an article, sandwiched between direct 
statements from survivors and activists. This same NPR article by Schrank, for example, 
begins by describing the monument’s design, but quickly transitions to a quote from Ok-seon 
Lee, a survivor who was present at the Glendale monument’s unveiling: “The comfort station 
where we were taken was not a place for human beings to live. It was a slaughterhouse. I’m 
telling you, it was killing people.”48 The article ends by noting the urgency that in part 
motivates survivors and activists to build these memorials with another quote from Lee:  
Why didn’t I die? Why am I alive? I lived for this long, and that’s why I can at least say 
something about this. But think of what sorrows the other women must have died with. We 
need to speak for them too.49 
Sandwiching oppositional voices between those of proponents and survivors is effective at 
judging their arguments as backward and amoral. This rhetorical strategy, common across most 
English-language media on this controversy, reflects the widely held assumptions, in American 
media at least, that it is only natural to support the monument and its proponents’ agenda. The 
logic undergirding this memorial-building movement is the common Holocaust maxim “never 
forget.”  
Although neither email bombing nor overwhelming numbers of Japanese attendants at 
the public hearing could convince Glendale’s city council to refuse the proposal, that did not 
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discourage these activists—or Japanese governmental representatives for that matter—from 
continuing to challenge the presence of the monument in Glendale’s public space. Following 
the vote on the Peace Monument, a group of eighty Japanese individuals opposed to the 
monument gathered at a nearby restaurant to discuss their disappointment.50 With the 
leadership of Kōichi Mera, they decided to form an organization to better manage their 
collective resources in a fight against the spread of “comfort women” commemoration across 
the U.S. One of the first actions of this newly formed organization, which they called the 
Global Alliance for Historical Truth, was to file a lawsuit against the City of Glendale to force 
the removal of the monument. Their primary argument was that, by installing the statue, 
Glendale had “infringe[d] upon the federal government’s power to exclusively conduct the 
foreign affairs of the United States and violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.”51 One of the co-plaintiffs, a longtime resident of Glendale, Michiko Gingery, 
also asserted that she suffers “feelings of exclusion, discomfort and anger” due to the 
monument’s presence in the park.  
Glendale’s city councilmembers were not fazed by the lawsuit. Laura Friedman 
reportedly commented that she thinks “the lawsuit will be put to bed very quickly and we can 
move on and we can be proud of this statue,” including a note that she was glad that the statue 
had garnered international attention for Glendale and the victims they wished to honor.52 
Similarly, Phyllis Kim, the single person most responsible for the Peace Monument project, 
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stated that “I trust the city of Glendale will handle it without any problems.”53 This lawsuit and 
councilmembers’ refusal to feel intimidated by the pressure occurred after several visits by 
Japanese politicians, who insisted that they came of their own accord, not as official 
representatives of the Japanese government.54 The city council refused to meet with them since 
they had agreed among themselves not to provide any fuel for unsympathetic Japanese media.55 
Councilmember Sinanyan did remark to the Glendale New-Press, however, that he does “regret 
the fact that the lawsuit was brought. It takes something that’s pure and it drags that pure into 
the gutter.”56 This series of attacks on the monument—the email campaign, flooding the city 
council chambers at the public hearing, Japanese politicians’ delegations, and the lawsuit—
thus only further motivated the city council to rally around the monument. Their personal 
reactions additionally inspired greater support from residents of nearby communities, such as 
John Gee, who said “this city, having that statue placed here, shows that it has a conscience. 
We need to keep the truth no matter how painful.”57 
Private citizens were not the only ones to express support for the City of Glendale in 
the face of the lawsuit. Sidley Thomas LLP, a Los Angeles law firm, offered to represent the 
city pro bono because it had a “long history of protecting the freedom of expression,” the law 
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firm’s chairman, Frank Broccolo, said.58 He continued to explain how, while the lawsuit was 
clearly without legal merit, “if the claims were to be accepted, it would restrict cities from 
expressing their freedom of expression, educating their citizens and encouraging discussion 
respective to matters of historical significance.”59 In other words, the stakes were considered 
to be very high from an American perspective, even if the lawsuit had little chance of 
succeeding. Neither the city councilmembers, the monument’s proponents, nor residents of 
surrounding communities were worried about the outcome of this lawsuit, nor were they 
intimidated by the international attention the controversy was attracting. Instead, it emboldened 
them to continue defying the Japanese government’s and nationalist activists’ desire to, as the 
English-language media portrays it, sweep Japan’s sordid past under the rug.  
Disregard for Japanese nationalist arguments has not deterred those activists from 
persevering, however. In addition to frequent fundraising activities held mostly in Japan to pay 
the lawyers’ fees for the lawsuit and its appeals, GAHT has organized a wide range of other 
activities aimed at convincing American society at large that the women involved in the 
“comfort women” system were not sex slaves, just regular prostitutes. Toward that end, Mera 
and a couple of other representatives of GAHT attended the July, 2014 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to assert that it is not 
appropriate for CEDAW to consider “comfort women” an unresolved matter.60 Mera continued 
to assert his views by conducting informational meetings and lectures in Los Angeles and San 
Diego in the latter half of 2014.61 He also led a press conference and lecture in New York City 
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that coincided with the March, 2015 meeting for the U.N. Commission on the Status of 
Women.62 The following month, GAHT members held a two-day conference at Central 
Washington University. It featured a revisionist film and lecture by Taniyama Yujiro, a man 
known for citing Western scholarship out of context to paint “comfort women” redress as a 
movement meant to oppress Japanese people.63 In addition to these events, by 2015 Mera had 
self-published a book entitled Comfort Women Not Sex Slaves. Along with his own book, he 
raised the funds to send to North American Japan scholars free copies of international relations 
professor Sonfa Oh’s Getting Over It: Why Korea Needs to Stop Bashing Japan (2015) and a 
book published by Sankei Shimbun’s editors entitled History Wars: Japan-False Indictment of 
the Century, Sankei Shimbun (2015). Mera believes that, while it may take a while, his 
organization’s efforts to debunk the “myth” of the “comfort women” will eventually make 
American society realize that the “comfort women” redress movement is using human rights 
language as a cover for their “real motive,” which is to promote hatred of Japan.64  
Thus, in Glendale, we again see a total failure on the part of conservative Japanese 
politicians and grassroots Japanese activists to convince a local American municipality to 
disengage from the movement commemorating “comfort women.” Not only did their 
collective actions fail to change the Glendale city council decision, it actually convinced them 
that their support of the monument was well founded. Furthermore, the city council’s stalwart 
refusal to budge on the monument proposal only encouraged Japanese activists to work harder 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Emi Koyama, “The U.S. as “Major Battleground” for “Comfort Women” Revisionism: The Screening of 
Scottboro Girls at Central Washington University,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 13:22:2 (June 3, 2015), 
https://apjjf.org/Emi-Koyama/4324.html. 
64 The original in Japanese: 「（慰安婦像の）目的は女性の人権を擁護するのであるとしているが、そ
の実際の目的は、日本国を蔑むことである」 “(Ianfuzō no) mokuteki ha josei no jinken wo yōgo suru no 
dearu to shiteiru ga, sono jissai no mokuteki ha, Nihonkoku wo sagesumu koto dearu.” 
Kōichi Mera, “GAHT Newsletter Number 1,” Global Alliance for Historical Truth, February 20, 2016, 1.  
 32 
and to become better organized in a war they saw as much larger than Glendale alone. As their 
organization’s name would suggest, they see anti-Japanese forces as global in scope and, 
indeed, more powerful than themselves. GAHT’s members see this daunting task, however, as 
a worthwhile one, and they continued to pursue it as comfort women redress made its way to 
San Francisco, the first “major” U.S. city to build a “comfort women” memorial.  
San Francisco 
 The “comfort women” memorial in San 
Francisco entailed far more fanfare than the 
Palisades Park or Glendale memorials, though 
with an equal dose of controversy. Its more 
spectacular unveiling is likely attributable to 
the commemoration movement having steadily 
gained momentum since it first began five 
years earlier in the small town of Palisades 
Park. The cultural character of San Francisco 
also had a great influence on the media 
attention the project received, the funding 
it could attract, and the design of the memorial itself. The city of San Francisco has a law 
requiring that all public buildings must feature original artwork. The specific provision 
requiring that public art be original is one reason why San Francisco is not hosting the same 
monument as Glendale. Instead, the San Francisco Arts Commission held an international 
Image 2: Women's Column of Strength, San Francisco 
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design competition with over thirty submissions. They decided on Steven Whyte’s submission 
in 2015.65 
Titled “Women’s Column of Strength,” Whyte’s design features three young women, 
with each one wearing clothes indicating their Korean, Chinese, or Filipino origins. Standing 
ten feet tall atop a cylindrical steel base, the height symbolizes victims’ rising above their 
violated past. They are holding hands, signifying their solidarity with all sexual abuse 
survivors. A few steps away stands another, elderly figure resembling Kim Hak-sun, the first 
survivor to speak in public about her painful life. She is looking at the young women with her 
hands clasped, a look of resilience on her face reminding audiences that justice will eventually 
have its resolution (see image 1).66  
 San Francisco’s project was led by two Chinese American women, Lillian Sing and 
Julie Tang. Both retired from their positions as Superior Court judges in order to raise the 
considerable funds required to commission this project and to navigate the city’s bureaucracy. 
Toward that end, they cofounded the Comfort Women Justice Coalition, which joined forces 
with the Korean American Forum of California, led by Phyllis Kim, to navigate the 
labyrinthian process that eventually entailed nearly twenty public hearings and committee 
meetings to attain the necessary approvals. At the urging of then-City Supervisor Eric Mar, the 
Board of Supervisors unanimously approved in 2015 the memorial’s installation on a terrace 
off the southeastern corner of St. Mary’s Square in Chinatown.67 After raising the $205,000 to 
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commission and maintain the memorial, Sing and Tang unveiled the memorial on September 
22, 2017.  
 While the proposal for the memorial passed unanimously through the San Francisco 
government, it did not do so without the same protesting forces that converged on Palisade 
Park and Glendale. Perhaps primed by news of previous “comfort women” memorials being 
built across the United States and the Japanese government’s well-known opposition to it, 
Japanese and Japanese American residents of San Francisco expressed their worries that the 
statue could give rise to a new wave of discrimination against people of Japanese descent in 
the city.68 Steven Whyte himself received well over one thousand negative social media 
messages and emails (mostly copy-and-paste) threatening economic boycotts of his work.69 
Kōichi Mera was in attendance at the Board of Supervisors public hearing where the council 
voted unanimously in support of the project. He stated that the 200,000 estimate of the number 
of victims, their forcible recruitment, and the slave-like conditions they endured are all 
fabrications. He proceeded to then attempt to highlight discrepancies in one particular 
survivor’s testimonies to suggest that all such testimonies are unreliable. Supervisor David 
Campos, exasperated at Mera’s words, interrupted him to say, “Mr. Mera, that’s not what she 
said. Are you calling her a liar?”70 That survivor was Lee Yongsoo, who was also in attendance 
at that very same meeting. Once Mera’s time was up, Lee, who was 89 years old at the time, 
stood up and yelled across the chambers at him in Korean. Although Mera was not the only 
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Japanese national voicing his opposition at this meeting, Campos and other audience members 
did not conceal their vexation with such claims.  
 Additional dissenting voices came from outside the U.S. Yoshihide Suga, Japan’s Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, said San Francisco’s decision is out of line with Japan’s official position, 
and that it was “extremely regrettable.”71 Jun Yamada, the consul general of Japan in San 
Francisco, published his own op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle the same day the memorial 
was unveiled. He wrote how the memorial movement is perpetuating certain one-sided 
interpretations without credible evidence.  
This is unwarranted and hardly conducive to objective fact-finding and mutual agreement, let 
alone a final reconciliation. Rather, they are rapidly alienating the entire Japanese public, who 
could otherwise be sympathetic to the wartime plight of these women, by unduly exacerbating 
emotional antagonism.72 
Protests emanating from Japan extended even to San Francisco’s sister city, Ōsaka. The two 
had become sister cities in 1957 as part of a project meant to foster reconciliation between two 
former enemies.73 In response to San Francisco agreeing to build the memorial despite 
vehement protests from Japan, Hirofumi Yoshimura, Ōsaka’s mayor at the time, stated “our 
relationship of trust was completely destroyed.”74 He severed the 60-year-old sister city ties 
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between the two cities, thereby preventing any public money from Ōsaka contributing to 
privately organized cultural exchanges between the two cities.  
 San Francisco witnessed the same types of oppositional strategies at work in Palisades 
Park, in Glendale, and in every other example of “comfort women” memorial construction in 
the United States. These strategies included preemptive email campaigns featuring identical 
messages, the frequently overwhelming presence of Japanese nationals at public hearings who 
deny the historical validity of characterizing “comfort women” as sex slaves, and not-so-subtle 
pressure from official representatives of the Japanese government urging the city council to 
reconsider their plans. These tactics have been consistent in both their approach and, more 
importantly, in their failure to prevent American communities from building increasingly 
provocative memorials.  
In the face of these failures, grassroots activists persist. Considering that these anti-
monument activists’ stated goal is to prevent or remove “comfort women” memorials from 
public spaces in the U.S. because they are manifestations of unfair anti-Japanese sentiment, it 
is perplexing that they appear wedded to tactics that only undermine their cause. In the chapters 
that follow, I suggest that their stated goals are actually of secondary importance relative to an 
underlying desire for a community in which they can feel proud of their Japanese identity. In 
other words, certain first-generation immigrants from Japan living in the U.S. feel to some 
degree alienated from the rest of American society and are genuinely fearful of the growing 
criticism of Japan for historical crimes that, for whatever reason, they do not believe are true. 
Rather than being primarily motivated by a desire to see the statues removed, however, I argue 
that they are instead seeking social and emotional refuge in a community of likeminded and 
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proud members of the Japanese nation. Participating in anti-monument activism is a vehicle 
through which they can pursue this emotional refuge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two—Why Glendale? The Cosmopolitan Heritage of an American 
City 
 
 In the face of hundreds of emails and protesting audience members warning the city 
not to involve itself in an ongoing “international issue,” Glendale’s city council voted 4-1 in 
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favor of building the Peace Monument on July 9, 2013. Why would the city council in an 
otherwise unassuming suburb immerse the city in a deeply politicized dispute over mass rape 
in a war that occurred over a half century before? The part of the answer I discuss here involves 
the local factors of the dispute in California (and the United States more generally). With its 
large and politically active Armenian American population, their own legacy of suffering a 
genocide in the early twentieth century made the city more sensitive to others’ claims to 
suffering violence on a massive scale and being denied justice for that suffering. Korean 
American activists then oriented themselves toward Glendale’s particular social fabric to 
maximize the effectiveness of their message and agenda. Importantly, activists were not 
inclined to communicate with their opponents in this debate. Rather, if we for the moment 
collapse the nuances of the controversy into two basic sides—whether the monument is or is 
not appropriate in Glendale—each side targeted its activities and publications toward those 
who might be, or who was already, sympathetic to their cause. Nobody was trying to change 
anyone else’s opinion if they already had one. Further, each side’s indirect motivations for 
engaging in this controversy diverge slightly. These indirect motivations, I suggest, stem from 
the histories of violent discrimination suffered by their ethnic communities in the United States 
and how those before them responded to such violence by asserting their, in this case, hybrid 
Korean and Korean American identity. On the other hand, rather than seeking to secure their 
position within an American sociopolitical environment, I argue that Japanese anti-redress 
activists were instead attracted to the community-building effects of mobilizing against the 
monument because, in part, it championed a diasporic Japanese identity as opposed to a more 
hybrid Japanese American identity.  
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The City of Glendale looks a lot like many other suburbs in California. With a rapidly 
growing population of approximately 200,000 residents, it is sandwiched between the City of 
Los Angeles and the Verdugo Mountains to its north. Glendale has played a relatively 
prominent role in American aviation history as it hosted the Grand Central Airport, which was 
the departure point for the first west-to-east transcontinental flight flown by Charles 
Lindbergh.75 Along with its multiple upscale shopping centers, architecturally significant 
homes, and multi-purpose theaters, Glendale is home to several large companies, including the 
Walt Disney Company, DreamWorks Animation, Nestlé, and the U.S. headquarters of the 
International House of Pancakes. Compared to many areas of Los Angeles, Glendale is an 
affordable yet accessible city with an impeccable safety record, making it attractive for families 
with children as well as for both newer and already well-established companies. 
Demographically, Glendale is a rather diverse city, much in line with the rest of the populous 
and multiethnic State of California. Though predominantly Caucasian, it is also home to well-
established Mexican American and Filipino American communities. However, key to this 
thesis’s argument are members of four other communities––Armenian Americans, Korean 
Americans, Japanese Americans, and Japanese expatriates––that I will briefly describe here.  
Observant visitors to Glendale will immediately notice the ubiquity of businesses 
featuring Armenian names and the red, blue, and orange colors of Armenia’s flag, Armenian 
churches, Armenian private schools, and public spaces named after Armenian philanthropists. 
Comprising approximately one-third of the city’s total population, Armenian Americans 
dominate much of the city’s government and civic life. Indeed, as of the completion of this 
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thesis, four of the five city council members are Armenian Americans. One of them, Zareh 
Sinanyan, is the mayor. At the peak of the controversy over the “comfort women” monument 
in 2013, Sinanyan and another Armenian American man, Ara Najarian, were and continue to 
be councilmembers. That the city council features a majority of Armenian Americans 
demonstrates how much the situation has changed in Glendale. In the 1920s, an active Ku Klux 
Klan group located itself in Glendale, and in the 1960s the West Coast Headquarters of the 
American Nazi Party did so as well.76 As Armenian migrants began arriving in northern Los 
Angeles and Glendale in the late 1980s, they were often greeted with discrimination and hatred 
based on their Armenian identity. Even in the face of this enmity, growth of ethnic Armenians 
continues unabated, with Glendale becoming one of the largest centers of diasporic Armenians 
in the world.  
This growing presence and local experience of the Armenian American community is 
pertinent to this thesis because that community remains passionately invested in 
commemorating the tragic legacy of the Armenian Genocide. Much of the international 
community considers as genocide the forceful deportation of Armenians from Ottoman 
territory in the years around 1915, in which 800,000 to 1.5 million people died, though the 
contemporary Turkish government continues to deny such claims.77 It also spends millions of 
dollars every year through international political, economic, and military arrangements to 
sustain its own official narrative that no genocide occurred.78 According to Melissa King’s 
ethnographic study of Armenian American youth in Glendale, Armenian Americans preserve 
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memories of Armenian woundedness and genocide to enable a form of resistance when 
claiming Armenian American subjectivity. More specifically, she maintains that the lack of 
official American recognition of the genocide is just as significant for the construction of 
Armenian American identity as is the memory of the genocide itself.79 I argue below that a 
similar process of identity construction operates among Korean Americans regarding the 
“comfort women” history, and that this similarity was integral to the successful construction 
of the Peace Monument in 2013.  
The small, yet vocal, Korean American community in Glendale has roots in the larger 
Korean American community in nearby Los Angeles. Koreans began immigrating to Los 
Angeles in the early twentieth century, followed by greater rates of immigration in the wake 
of the Korean War. The Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 instituted a preferential immigration system 
based on family relationships and occupational skill, thereby opening the door to yet more 
immigrants from Korea.80 This latter wave of immigration brought many highly educated 
individuals intent on escaping the long-term instability of the Korean peninsula to Southern 
California. Migrants from all over the world, including Koreans, felt attracted to the United 
States’ advertised promise that justice there was equal and that anything was possible with 
hard work, the “American dream” as it were. As Claire Jean Kim articulated in “The Racial 
Triangulation of Asian Americans,” Asian migrants came to the U.S. unaware of racial 
hierarchies and where they might fall within that classification system. They would eventually 
realize that American popular culture would represent Asian Americans in a more positive way 
than, say, African Americans, but as nevertheless perpetually foreign, as not fully American. 
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Kim then argues that this triangulating configuration of Asian Americans helped to uphold the 
unequal racial status quo by encouraging non-whites to maintain race-based divisions among 
themselves.81   
As a community, Korean Americans remained mostly indistinct, even invisible, to the 
rest of American society until April 29, 1992, when they experienced what Elaine Kim has 
called their unwilling initiation into being American or, more precisely, their forceful 
incorporation into the centuries-long systemic practice of racial violence and inequality.82 On 
that day, a predominantly white jury acquitted four white police officers of all charges 
regarding the use of overwhelming force in their arrest of Rodney King, an African American 
taxi driver. A local resident had recorded the incident, which validated repeated complaints by 
minority leaders in Los Angeles about harassment and excessive use of force by LAPD 
officers.83 The “not guilty” verdict threw Los Angeles into several days of violent, civil unrest 
that mass media broadcasted as it was happening. In what became known as the “L.A. riots,” 
Korean Americans suddenly found themselves on the front lines of the uprising. Korean 
American shop owners in the South Central neighborhood at the time were relatively affluent 
compared to the impoverished residents, whom they often exploited as laborers or looked down 
upon as lazy fools.84 These predominantly African American local residents in turn tended to 
see Korean Americans as foreigners who only took from the surrounding communities without 
contributing anything in return. Thus, since the police essentially abandoned South Central to 
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protect more affluent neighborhoods westward toward the coast, Korean American businesses 
became the most obvious target for looters. 
As Korean American businesses bore the brunt of the destruction and looting in these 
riots, live broadcasts focused on images of unfathomable, gun-wielding Korean American 
merchants fending off mostly African American and Latino inner-city residents trying to 
plunder their stores. Subsequently, news programs and talk shows explained the violence 
through scapegoating Korean Americans by having black and white commentators—and no 
Korean Americans—rail against Koreans as rude and exploitive merchants who had ruined 
peaceful race relations for everyone else.85 When the riots erupted, Korean American store 
owners dialed 911 to get help defending their property and to call ambulances for people who 
were shot. Yet, neither the police nor the ambulances came. Over the course of six days, Korean 
American property damage totaled approximately $350 million, roughly forty-five percent of 
the total damages incurred, despite Korean Americans only comprising 1.6 percent of the city’s 
population.86  
Abandoned by the police, ignored by politicians, and scapegoated by the media, the 
1992 L.A. riots, known to Korean Americans as sa-i-gu (literally “4-2-9,” or April 29 in 
Korean), powerfully affected younger Korean Americans’ political consciousness. Subsequent 
scholarship, poetry, theater plays, documentaries, and music memorialized this event and 
helped create a distinctly racialized identity among Korean Americans as both racially Asian 
(resulting from their representation in the media) and culturally American (resulting from their 
inclusion in the American racial hierarchy). Subsequently, the riots prompted many better-off 
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Korean American families to move to suburbs. Nearby Glendale was one of these suburban 
havens for Korean Americans keen on leaving Los Angeles. Korean American political 
engagement in mainstream American politics has strengthened and maintained momentum to 
this day, including broad efforts across the United States to construct monuments to the victims 
and survivors of imperial Japan’s military “comfort women” prostitution system. The Peace 
Monument in Glendale is both a reflection and mobilizing component of grassroots Korean 
American activism.  
Media coverage of Glendale’s Peace Monument controversy often conflate two more 
pertinent communities in and around Glendale—the Japanese and Japanese American 
communities. Both communities are internally divided in myriad ways, as is any community, 
but when it comes to relating to Japan and WWII, the two tend to diverge in a clear manner. 
First, Japanese Americans in Southern California are largely supportive of Korean American 
efforts to commemorate imperial Japan’s wartime victims. The term “Japanese American” 
refers to people whose parents or even grandparents were born in the United States, typically 
before or during the Second World War, and who are American citizens. As an Asian minority, 
Japanese Americans’ history in the United States is as tumultuous as that of Korean Americans. 
Most notably, during WWII, regardless of their citizenship, Japanese Americans were rounded 
up and forced into concentrations camps located in isolated and harsh areas of desert or swamps 
in Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming. Following the 
cessation of the war, Japanese American civil rights organizations, such as the Japanese 
American Citizens League (JACL) and Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress (NCRR), 
campaigned persistently for redress from the federal government for the wholesale violation 
of their rights as Americans. In his exploration of the strained relationship between second- 
 45 
and third-generation Japanese Americans in the Bay Area of California, Jere Takahashi, a 
Japanese American born in the Topaz internment camp, discussed how Japanese Americans 
upheld ethnic solidarity and reliance on group structure within overarching narratives of 
citizenship and loyalty to America.87 Efforts couched in this ethos culminated in the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988, which granted an official apology from the U.S. government and 
authorized the payment of reparations to all camp survivors.88 Japanese Americans whose 
identities are shaped by this heritage tend to be politically progressive and supportive of other 
ethnic minorities’ struggles for civic recognition and protection in the U.S., such as when the 
JACL issued a statement condemning anti-Muslim rhetoric in 2015.89 JACL and NCRR 
support of “comfort women” statues is similarly in line with their tradition of social justice 
activism.  
Distinct from Japanese Americans is a separate Japanese community also present 
throughout California. Labelled as shin issei, or “new first generation,” by Asian American 
activists and scholars, this community consists of first-generation immigrants from Japan who 
moved to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, typically as employees of Japanese 
companies that were then expanding their operations overseas.90 Unlike most prewar Japanese 
immigrants, shin issei tend to be highly educated individuals who migrated with greater 
financial resources as part of the post-1965 wave of skilled Asian immigrants.91 Their 
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immigration to the U.S. roughly coincided with a rise in the 1980s of widespread anti-Japanese 
sentiment, however, due to trade conflicts between the two countries and perceptions among 
American workers that Japan was actively destroying their livelihoods. This anti-Japanese 
sentiment centered mainly in regions hosting car manufacturing centers, such as Detroit. Anti-
Japanese sentiment eventually resulted in a violent crime that achieved national visibility, 
namely, the murder of Vincent Chin on June 19, 1982. Two white employees of the local 
Chrysler car plant mistook the Chinese American man for a Japanese man and assaulted and 
murdered him in a suburb of Detroit. The two murderers were eventually acquitted of all 
charges and spent zero days in jail.  
The Vincent Chin murder case had an enormous impact on not just how Japanese 
Americans, but how all Asian Americans understood their position within an American racial 
hierarchy. While this case’s specific impact on shin issei communities across the United States 
is understudied, Dana Frank examines how the American auto industry used advertising 
campaigns to attribute American workers’ massive layoffs to Japan, which combined with 
already prevalent anti-Japanese images in American popular culture.92 For instance, 
blockbuster movies like Blade Runner (1982) and Back to the Future II (1989) portrayed 
American workers being worked like slaves under Japanese superiors. Whereas Japanese 
Americans have striven to assert their authentic American-ness through political activism, shin 
issei seem to have kept their collective heads down, preferring to avoid confrontation rather 
than try to change American society. Thus, throughout their time in the U.S., members of the 
shin issei community have undoubtedly experienced hostility, but they have nevertheless 
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quietly persisted, and many continue to reside in the U.S. to the present day. Many have also 
married American citizens and raised their families in the U.S. while still orienting their own 
selves toward Japan, retaining their Japanese citizenship, and seeing themselves as “Japanese 
residents in America” (zaibei nihonjin) rather than as Japanese Americans.  
 The Armenian American, Korean American, Japanese American, and shin issei 
Japanese communities in and around Glendale all have their own separate experiences of 
discrimination as racialized minorities, whether they experienced that violence personally, 
heard stories about it from older family members living in the United States or abroad, or a 
combination of all those possibilities. Additionally, with the exception of shin issei Japanese 
residents, each of these communities has struggled, often with help from people of other ethnic 
communities, to create a space in which they can belong and be accepted as Americans. These 
struggles have taken various forms, though the most prominent was demonstrated by Japanese 
Americans who successfully demanded redress from the federal government for the internment 
of Japanese Americans during WWII. This social context and extensive experience fighting 
for civil rights in the U.S. has molded Glendale’s residents and leadership to be particularly 
receptive to human rights debates that emerge within the purview of their city.  
*** 
In Chapter Three, I examine in detail the special meeting in Glendale where members 
of the public could state their opinion on the proposal to build a monument dedicated to the 
victims and survivors of imperial Japan’s wartime system of sexual slavery. I consider the 
tense interaction between pro-monument and anti-monument speakers through the lens of 
Rosenwein’s emotional communities. That is, rather than characterizing this event as a debate 
on historiographical standards, which is how it looks on the surface, examining the emotional 
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dimension of this debate suggests that the conflict has more to do with conflicting collective 
identities than with a concern for how history is to be written. I also reflect on the relationship 
between “historical truth” and “historical revisionism,” two frequently used terms in this 
debate, and how the blurry distinction between these two concepts corresponds to present 
political concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three—The Emotion of Historical Truth and Historical 
Revisionism 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the various arguments people used during the July 9, 2013 
public hearing in Glendale concerning the proposal for the Peace Monument. The social 
fracturing in Glendale surrounding this proposal may appear to coincide with ethnic 
boundaries, though I contend that a clash of emotional communities, as opposed to ethnic 
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communities, more accurately reflects the mutual antagonism in the room. In other words, 
Glendale, as represented by its city council, is emotionally oriented around honoring victims. 
Glendale’s most politically represented emotional community then collided with a local 
expatriate Japanese community emotionally oriented toward defending the honor of their 
national forebears. These two emotional communities came into conflict because each believed 
that the history they use to justify their target of veneration necessarily discounts the other 
group’s preferred history. Here, I focus on the opponents to the monument who eventually 
formed an organization called the “Global Alliance for Historical Truth” (GAHT).  
While historical interpretations must be based on evidence, which evidence is deemed 
legitimate and valid is a subjective and often political process, especially when it involves 
large-scale and grievous matters like mass sexual slavery. A multitude of factors go into this 
process of determining “correct” history, but in the case of the controversy in Glendale, I 
maintain that fear is a central motivating factor that should not be ignored. Hinging on the fear 
that motivates the various actors in this story are two terms that come up frequently in the 
debate on Japan’s wartime sexual slavery, including at the special hearing in Glendale: 
“historical truth” and “history denial.” When people claim their own historical interpretation 
to be “the truth,” they often do so on the assumption that their position is vindicated by the 
extant evidence and that anyone who diverges from their interpretation is a “history denier.” If 
the person is more formally educated, they are often called a “historical revisionist.” Although 
labelling someone a history denier is obviously pejorative in intent, labelling someone a 
historical revisionist has greater nuance.  
In the context of the debate on the history of Japan’s military sex slaves, historical 
revisionism refers to those who would erase sexual slavery entirely from the official story of 
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Japan’s actions during the Second World War. However, every act of representing the past in 
the present is an act of revising the past in light of the present. In their discussion of historical 
revisionism regarding the Holocaust and the Asia-Pacific War, Iwasaki Minoru and Steffi 
Richter postulate that, rather than being a reflexive practice of reevaluating evidence, historical 
revisionism should instead be understood as an emotion or disposition, a mode of being 
uninterested in actual debate that seeks rather to eliminate the negative implications of 
historical events for the present via discursive strategies to mystify historical consensus.93 
Here, I set aside the details of scholarly historiography on “comfort women” to instead consider 
how grassroots activists and local politicians make sense of contradictory historical “truths” 
on the ground. My approach in this chapter combines Rosenwein’s emotional communities 
with Iwasaki’s and Richter’s characterization of historical revisionism as fundamentally an 
emotional and, in this case, a largely fear-driven behavior. This compulsion manifests in anti-
monument speakers’ use of the language of “unbiased knowledge,” “objectivity,” and “truth” 
to challenge the city council’s understanding of the historical consensus. I argue that 
conceiving historical revisionism as an emotional disposition and as the core of an emotional 
community helps to explain one important dimension of how this controversy operated on the 
local, rather than transnational, level.  
Facts as Weapons 
Unlike most meetings designed for receiving public comments in Glendale, the one 
that took place on July 9, 2013 attracted so many people that the chambers filled to capacity 
and the building’s overflow room put to use. A total of thirty speakers from the audience 
                                                 
93 Iwasaki Minoru, Steffi Richter, and Richard F. Calichman (translator), “The Topology of Post-1990s 
Historical Revisionism,” positions: east asia cultures critique 16:3 (Winter 2008): 507-538, 516.  
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expressed their thoughts to the city council. Only seven individuals spoke in support of the 
monument. While this relatively small number of vocal supporters may make it seem that 
Glendale residents were apathetic regarding the potential monument, more people might have 
been unable to attend since the meeting began at three in the afternoon on a Tuesday, before 
most people finish their workday. Of these seven individuals, three were from the Korean 
American Forum of California, the organization that raised the funds and commissioned the 
monument in the first place. One additional person, Alex Wu, was the representative for 
Glendale’s two Korean sister cities at that time. The remaining three advocates who spoke that 
day were unaffiliated residents of Glendale.  
Most speakers in the room that day were Japanese individuals living scattered across 
California. The city council expected a large turnout since, in the weeks leading up to the 
special meeting, their inboxes were flooded with hundreds of emails fiercely demanding that 
the city reject the proposal for a monument honoring “prostitutes.” The vast majority of these 
emails were identical copies, with only the name of the sender differing (for one example, see 
the appendix). These were not sent by spamming robots, however. Rather, a Japanese woman 
and neonationalist activist living in Japan named Yamamoto Yūmiko provided model emails 
in both English and Japanese, where an individual merely needed to copy and paste the text, 
include their name, and send it off to the target. She provided these models through the website 
for her organization, “Nadeshiko Action: Japanese Women for Justice and Peace,” though the 
Japanese version of the name translates to “Nadeshiko Action: The Network Connecting 
Correct History for the Next Generation.”  Her choice to use “nadeshiko,” which refers to a 
flower traditionally associated with Japanese feminine beauty, reflects her multifaceted 
attempts to attract women to an otherwise male-dominated movement of reviving nationalistic 
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pride among Japanese people. The success she has had at attracting Japanese women to the 
cause of defending Japan from redress activism related to former military sex slaves is 
conveyed to some extent in the considerable turnout and composition of speakers at the special 
meeting in Glendale who were opposed to the monument. Out of the thirty total speakers, 
twenty-three expressed their opposition, and all but two of them were shin issei Japanese 
immigrants, and roughly half of them were women. 
 Each speaker had two minutes to make a statement. For nearly every speaker that day, 
English was their second language, which added to the difficulties of speaking smoothly and 
clearly about something they considered important while in public and on camera.94 The 
majority of them were older (at least fifty years of age) individuals who had been born in Japan 
and had moved to the United States two to four decades prior. Perhaps self-conscious of their 
accents and worried about being seen as outsiders, many of them took care to preface their 
statement by emphasizing the time they have lived in the U.S. and their gratitude for the 
opportunity to express their opinions on this issue.  
Most opponents of the proposal insisted that the monument was not based on a 
thorough historical investigation. The first speaker for the opposition was Tomoyuki Sumori, 
a late-middle-aged shin issei man living in Irvine, California. After thanking the council for 
the opportunity to speak and stating his opposition, he went on to assert that no Asian country 
can claim to be innocent of violating human rights. He did not accuse the United States of 
violating human rights at any time, however. The combination of nervousness and having a lot 
to say led Sumori to lose his place in his notes, though once he recovered, he said:  
                                                 
94 Video recordings of the city council’s meetings are available at: 
http://www.glendaleca.gov/government/departments/management-services/gtv6/watch-city-meetings 
 53 
I hope you, councilmembers and mayor, you will make a decision based on [the] spirit of 
fair[ness] and justice. And, comfort women issue is a controversial issue. I hope you have 
exhausted your investigation, independent, unbiased investigation. This is so controversial, 
unless you have made a thorough and unbiased checkup, you should not make judgement now. 
At least you should defer it until you find it.95  
Sumori had run out of time before continuing to the next point he had prepared. Several of the 
speakers following him similarly suggested that, if only the council had indeed investigated 
the historical relationship between “prostitutes” and the imperial Japanese military, they would 
realize that the stories told by survivors’ supporters were biased, inaccurate, or fabricated 
entirely.  
 Sumori’s comments suggest an understanding of history as a compilation of objective 
facts that exist independently of the interpretation of the historian. That is to say, a person in 
the present must merely read the facts with an “unbiased” mind to arrive at the historical truth. 
However, most historians today would not agree that reading the past is simply a matter of 
reading the facts that have been collected. As E.H. Carr notes in his essay “The Historian and 
His Facts,” there is a crucial difference between facts about the past and historical facts.96 For 
example, prior to the 1980s when South Korean activists first began raising awareness about 
wartime sexual slavery, it was a demonstrable fact based on confidential oral testimony that a 
very large number of women had been deceived, kidnapped, or sold into the “comfort women” 
system, though it had been ignored by all official governing entities since the Tokyo Trials.97 
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It was a fact about the past, but not a historical fact. Once this issue of wartime sexual slavery 
started to become acknowledged in public, considered a central aspect of the war, and 
explanations for it debated, it became a historical fact, much like the fact that the United States 
dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 is a statement of truth 
about the past that virtually everyone agrees carried profound significance for subsequent 
events in the human world. Such a comparison demonstrates the basic point that history is not 
a compilation of every piece of information available. Rather, history is necessarily a selection 
of facts considered relevant to the present by the historian, whether they be professionally 
trained or someone merely trying to understand the past. In other words, facts do not become 
historical facts without the subjective input of the one making evidence-based claims about the 
past.  
 History, then, is made by people, professionally trained or not, who are inescapably 
bound to the present conditions in which they live. Carr himself is also quick to point out that 
history is not only the interpretation of select facts. It is, rather, a continuous process of 
interaction between the historian and their facts, an unending dialogue between the present and 
the past.98 Another thing history is not is the opinion of a single historian. Which facts are 
considered relevant to the present are determined by the often uneven consensus of others. 
Interpretation, disagreement, and consensus about what select information about the past 
means for us in the present is the substance of history, not the facts those interpretations are 
grounded in.  
                                                 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of WWII (Cambridge, Mass.: University of Harvard 
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98 Carr, “The Historian and His Facts,” 30.  
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Even if one were to subscribe to the understanding of history as a compendium of 
verifiable facts, one could easily find an immense body of scholarship on the “comfort women” 
system. However, Sumori and those like him seem to be unaware of this more reflexive 
conception of history. More important than this, however, is that most speakers that day had 
greater reason to see history as a compendium of verifiable facts and to also discount anything 
that fails to support their ostensible “side” of the debate (i.e., the victims of imperial Japan’s 
sexual slavery or the nation of Japan). Sumori’s passion for this subject suggests that he cares 
deeply about Japan’s reputation in the world since he sees it as his true home, his heritage, and 
that much of what defines him as a person is rooted in Japan. When such a sacred object is 
criticized for gross violations of human dignity, he feels as if he is personally being attacked. 
He responded with a mixture of anger and fear his fellow shin issei in the audience received in 
sympathy. In contrast, the city council and other supporters of the monument responded to him 
with censure, outrage, and condemnation. Before considering supporters of the monument, let 
us continue to examine opponents’ arguments.  
 Other monument opponents repeatedly cited a specific document to dismiss the 
evidentiary basis of the proposed monument. Invoking this document usually accompanies the 
argument that more objective information about the sexual slavery system needs to be 
uncovered, as Sumori suggested, but that available American evidence proves that the system 
had not constituted any form of slavery at all. A middle-aged man wearing a short-sleeve 
Hawaiian shirt with thick, wavy black hair and a mustache named Yoshi Miyake, for example, 
phrased this position in the following words: 
It’s about time for [Koreans] to face the truth and reality. The comfort women were, as [the] 
U.S. army noted in 1944 during World War II: “Comfort ladies are nothing more than 
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prostitute[s] or professional camp followers. These girls were allowed to refuse customers if 
they want[ed] to, and they were making at least fifty times more than [what the] average 
Japanese soldier get[s].” You call this sex slave?!99 
The document Miyake is referring to is “Report No. 49: Japanese Prisoners of War 
Interrogation on Prostitution undertaken by United States of War Information Psychological 
Warfare Team Attached to U.S. Army Forces India-Burma Theater, APO 689.” The document 
is based on information gathered from twenty Korean women and two Japanese civilians U.S. 
forces had captured in 1944 in southern Burma. It is a frequently misquoted document by 
nationalistic groups in Japan dedicated to sanitizing Japan’s history. One of the most influential 
of these groups is the Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact (SDHF), whose 
secretary, Moteki Hiromichi, is well known among North American Japan specialists as the 
man who sends them unwanted essays written in English justifying Japan’s wartime actions 
during WWII.100 Tessa Morris-Suzuki has debunked this document along with many other 
primary sources—mostly passing mentions, sketchy anecdotes, tersely labeled photographs—
produced by Allied troops and civilians across Asia who observed the “comfort women” 
system.101 Report No. 49 documents the testimony of a man named Kitamura who ran a brothel 
on behalf of the Japanese military in Burma. It details the heavy reliance on recruitment by 
deception and subsequent use of debt bondage to keep recruited women in line. Kitamura is 
attributed with stating that the girls on average would gross approximately 1,500 yen per 
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month, though when cross-referenced with a separate report also written by U.S. forces, 
Morris-Suzuki demonstrates how the average gross income of each girl was likely under 300 
yen, which was then almost entirely confiscated for various fees by Kitamura.  
Using documents like Report No. 49 in this (or any similar) controversy without critical 
contextualization regarding the circumstances of its production is poor historiographical 
practice. When Miyake and others use this document in this unreflexive way, it becomes a 
prime example of Iwasaki and Richter’s conceptualization of “historical revisionism” as an 
emotional disposition rather than a more dialogical practice of reevaluating evidence in light 
of present circumstances. Historical revisionists, in Iwasaki and Richter’s perspective, are 
uninterested in and unable to endure a more comprehensive assessment of historical data when 
formulating their positions because their goal is not to revise history in light of new information 
and changing perspectives. They are rather forcing an interpretation to justify an ongoing and 
defensive emotional reaction.102  
Iwasaki and Richter additionally identify three characteristics or rhetorical strategies 
typical of historical revisionism. One is the obsession with “objective” facts that, in a 
paradoxical manner, works to undermine consensus on most facts. Along these lines, Miyake’s 
insistence that imperial Japan’s sexual slavery system was actually just plain prostitution is an 
attempt to challenge everything else we know based on historical documents and oral 
testimonies about how the Japanese imperial regime managed soldiers’ sexuality. This rhetoric 
of objective facts also echoes with and is, to a large extent, rooted in the constant publications 
of the previously mentioned SDHF, whose reach is indeed global.103 Another characteristic is 
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the desire for a strong national narrative that often becomes a monologic narrative of 
narcissism. Miyake and others conflate the imperial Japanese regime with the current Japanese 
government. They also seem to equate themselves with this ahistorical notion of “Japan,” 
thereby conflating the honor of the Japanese nation-state with their own personal dignity as 
Japanese citizens. In other words, in his configuration of this controversy, Miyake’s fight is as 
much about defending Japan as it is about defending himself. Failing to fight for Japan would 
not only leave it morally tainted in the eyes of the world, he too, even in his Californian present, 
would be morally tainted regardless of his personal, historical, and geographical distance from 
the events being discussed. The final characteristic Iwasaki and Richter identify is the implicit 
anxiety within historical revisionism about globalization as an inherently destabilizing force.104 
Iwasaki and Richter locate the root of historical revisionism as emotional disposition 
in a deep-seated collective identity crisis that many people born after the end of the war seem 
to be experiencing. Referring to participant-observation studies into the infamous Society for 
History Textbook Reform (Atarashii kyōkasho wo tsukuru kai, hereafter “Tsukurukai”) 
conducted by Ueno Yōko and Oguma Eiji, they discuss how the older generation of this 
organization’s members sought a social space where they, as people who experienced the war 
and who wished to recuperate the pride they felt being Japanese, could clearly express their 
memories and views on life and the world.105 However, the children and grandchildren of this 
older generation do not possess the same core identity as those who personally experienced the 
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war even if they are similarly seeking a recuperated pride in Japan and being Japanese. This 
finding echoes Jeffrey Alexander’s conception of cultural trauma, specifically the role of social 
context and representation (i.e. memory) in the inheritance of trauma across generational lines. 
In many cases, Alexander asserts, generations of people with no direct experience of trauma 
can nevertheless feel equally, or even more, traumatized than generations who did have direct 
experience.106 My findings concerning the controversy in Glendale are in line with this much 
broader scholarship on cultural trauma and historical memory, though I see fear as a 
particularly potent motivating factor for anti-monument activists in Glendale. Further, finding 
a sense of social or emotional refuge by sharing this fear with others is the deeper attraction 
for these individuals than is arguing about standards for evaluating historical evidence.   
Building on Iwasaki and Richter’s exploration of post-1990s historical revisionism, my 
findings suggest that historical revisionism attracts fearful people. Take, for example, a man 
named Takahashi, a thin man in his fifties or sixties wearing a loose-fitting brown polo shirt 
and glasses who spent most of his two-minute time allotment at the Glendale meeting trying 
to add authoritative weight to his concluding comment by listing the seventy-five countries he 
had travelled to: 
Now, I just wanted to say one thing. Looking at those seventy-five countries I visited, I’ve 
never seen anything like that kind of, so-called, ‘Peace Monument’ other than in a Communist 
country where there’s a lot of well-planned propaganda. I don’t think the City of Glendale is 
one of them.107 
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Regardless of whether a monument dedicated to the memory of victims of sexual violence in 
warfare exists in communist countries, by vaguely comparing the Peace Monument to a 
threatening specter of communism, Takahashi was probably expressing both his own fear of 
communist manipulations of public memory in California and trying to stoke that same fear 
among the city council.  
References to communism—likely used as a thinly veiled code word for the People’s 
Republic of China—as a threat to Japan were echoed by Kiko Suji, who presented her own 
take on the history of the comfort women system. A shorter woman in her 60s and in 
conservative attire, she read slowly and carefully from a script. She spoke of a book, Watashi 
no sensō hanzai (My War Crimes, 1983), written by a Japanese man named Yoshida Seiji. In 
the book, Yoshida included vivid details of how he recruited hundreds of Korean women 
through deception and physical force when he worked for the state, coordinating the flow of 
labor conscripts between Korea and Japan. Agents of the Japanese state, he described in vivid 
detail, would force women into military warehouses where they were kept so that soldiers 
could rape them before embarking on ships headed to the warfront. Suji called him a 
communist, one who eventually admitted that he had lied in his book for money. (Indeed, both 
progressive and conservative historians have disproven Yoshida’s claims). Suji concluded her 
statement with the following words:  
I do not know why [the] City of Glendale tried to give permission to build the statue. It will 
bring hate crimes to the world and I think it is not good for children or the country.108  
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I believe it is appropriate to consider as hyperbolic her claim that a monument dedicated to an 
historical case of sexual slavery would increase hate crimes on a global level. She more likely 
means that she fears that such a monument would make her own world in southern California 
seem more hateful, and that, by “children of the country,” she specifically means Japanese 
children living in the United States.  
Female “historical revisionists” in particular invoke fear on behalf of their own 
children’s wellbeing, or for children in general. The only woman who spoke against the 
proposal who also identified herself as a Japanese American introduced herself by the letters 
TN and wore a large hat and sunglasses, all to protect her privacy, but made a point to mention 
that she had been a resident of Glendale for over thirty years. TN reported that she had 
researched anti-Japanese protests in Seoul. With a nervous tremble in her voice, she held up a 
photograph of one such demonstration in Seoul. As a single mother of a five-year-old, she was 
concerned about the violence depicted in the photograph coming to Glendale if the Peace 
Monument were to be installed there. She was sure that the monument would have an enormous 
effect:  
[The Peace Monument will] not only bring violence, but hatred. I would like to see the council 
and the mayor reconsider this decision to approve, and to investigate with fairness as the other 
speaker has said. Please take a look at this, what part of this picture shows peace? I have many 
Korean friends, I have been a citizen here for a long time, I am not anti-Korean, but peace can 
be demonstrated in a different way, and this is going to be an international chaos and separation 
and prejudice toward the Japanese Americans and Japanese who live here.109 
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TN expressed an urgent sense of danger, that the Peace Monument would inevitably spark 
violent chaos in the streets of Glendale and would alienate Japanese and Japanese Americans 
from the rest of society. What is absent from her rationale is any consideration of what the 
activists who commissioned the monument intended it to mean (i.e., to commemorate the 
victims of the “comfort women” system so that it never happens again). She does not contest 
any particular version of the history of the comfort women system, nor does she seem bothered 
with a distinction between sexual slavery and prostitution. Instead, her overwhelming concern 
is with the potential threat of violence against herself, her child, and her community that this 
monument represents to her. That certain members of the public read the monument as 
signifying meanings that are literally the opposite of what its supporters repetitively say their 
intentions are demonstrates how, as the controversy unfolds, the original intention behind the 
monument can become murkier as participants in the debate interpret it in divergent and self-
oriented ways. Rather than a starting point for a discussion for how to make the world a safer 
place for women, TN’s statement demonstrates how the monument can come to evoke a specter 
of violence and terror.  
Organizing the Emotional Community through the Global Alliance for Historical Truth 
 Before examining the arguments of the monument’s supporters in a similar fashion, 
which I do in detail in the following chapter, I will first discuss the effect that special meeting 
in Glendale had on the shin issei who spoke there. Their failure to convince the city council to 
reconsider their support for the monument prompted a group of like-minded individuals to 
gather at a local restaurant to discuss their disappointment with how that meeting had gone. 
They were also seeking solidarity with others who felt similarly disrespected, even persecuted, 
after the city council dismissed their pleas. They found a leader in a man named Kōichi Mera. 
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Born in 1933, he received his bachelor’s degree in engineering and architecture from Tokyo 
University and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in urban planning. Throughout his life he has 
worked for the World Bank as an economist and as a professor of business and public 
administration for Tsukuba University, Tokyo International University, and, most recently, 
University of Southern California (USC). He is reviled among pro-redress and human rights 
activists as a man uninterested in anything other than asserting that the women in this system 
were voluntary prostitutes, not sex slaves, and not deserving of being honored in any way. 
However, before becoming a central figure in the American arena of Japanese resistance 
against comfort women commemoration, to occupy his time after retiring from his university-
teaching position at USC he founded the Study Group for Japan’s Rebirth (Nippon saisei 
kenkyū kai) in 2006. This is a Japanese-language study group on modern Japanese history from 
a nationalist perspective for shin issei residents in California. I first met Dr. Mera, or Mera-
sensei, as he prefers to be called, through an alumnus of Tokyo University I met at a 
symposium at the University of California, Los Angeles. After I explained to him that I was 
trying to contact the man in charge of the opposition to Glendale’s Peace Monument, he 
serendipitously informed me that he personally knows Mera from the Southern California 
Alumni Association of the University of Tokyo (Nanka tōdai kai).110 After contacting Mera, 
we met at the Brentwood Country Club to discuss his activism and the organization he is 
leading.  
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 According to Mera, after that public hearing in Glendale in 2013, he and a large group 
of others decided to form an organization that would better coordinate their resources to 
combat what they saw as a transnational movement to tarnish Japan’s reputation in the world, 
especially within the United States, Japan’s most important ally. They called themselves the 
Global Alliance for Historical Truth (GAHT). Its website consists primarily of Japanese text, 
reflecting the organization’s strong identification with and orientation toward Japan.111 Most 
of its funding also comes from individual donors in Japan, according to Mera.112  GAHT’s self-
proclaimed mission is to defend Japan’s “national honor” from movements seeking to disgrace 
it. GAHT believes these movements are led by “neighboring countries” (i.e., South Korea and 
China) and harm Japan by spreading among Japan’s allies “fabricated history” that portrays 
Japanese people as “abnormally cruel” and “inhumane.” GAHT’s purpose, then, is to counter 
these movements by sharing what they declare to be fact-based historical evidence and 
interpretations. It also raised funds for lawsuits and appeals against the City of Glendale based 
on the argument that the city violated the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, which 
invests the power to conduct international relations solely in the federal government. By 
involving itself in what he considered an exclusively diplomatic issue between the 
governments of South Korea and Japan, Mera maintained that Glendale had violated the 
Constitution.113 Mera appealed the case each time the presiding judge dismissed it until the 
Supreme Court declined to hear it in 2017. 
                                                 
111 Within a year of this writing, a link to a much more basic website with English text was incorporated, though 
it lacks the frequent updates included on the Japanese page: http://gaht.jp/aboutGAHT.html 
112 Kōichi Mera, Interview by Kai Wasson, January 19, 2017.  
113 Kōichi Mera, Interview by Kai Wasson, January 19, 2017.  
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GAHT is a registered nonprofit organization in the state of California that targets a 
small section of diasporic Japanese individuals who live there. Apart from its informational 
meetings and fundraising initiatives, I maintain that it functions as a social and emotional 
refuge for Japanese residents in southern California who feel to some degree alienated from 
the rest of American society, even though most of GAHT’s members have lived in the U.S. for 
decades, have married American citizens, and have children and even grandchildren who grew 
up in the U.S. I understand emotional refuge in the same way as William Reddy, a prominent 
historian of emotions, who defines it alongside the concept of “emotional regime.”114 
Emotional regime refers to the cultural, social, and political institutions that help determine 
which emotional reactions are appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation or social space. 
Emotional refuge, by contrast, refers to a physical or metaphorical space in which one can 
utilize normally inappropriate or unsanctioned emotional expressions without social 
repercussion, thereby accommodating individual agency and allowing people to shape or 
challenge the emotional regime. Overlapping to a large extent with Rosenwein’s emotional 
communities, I contend that attending informational meetings, donating money, or at least 
subscribing to GAHT’s emails constitutes that space in which people can express otherwise 
sanctioned emotional reactions or political opinions (e.g., the notion that redress for the victims 
of the “comfort women” system is unnecessary and ill-informed).  
Take, for example, Yōko Takahashi’s discovery of and entrance into GAHT.115 Having 
moved to the United States when she was twenty-three years old with a desire for adventure, 
                                                 
114 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
115 Yōko Takahashi (a pseudonym). Interview by Kai Wasson. February 11, 2017.  
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she first enrolled in a community college in the San Francisco Bay area, then earned a master’s 
degree in architecture, and eventually opened her own interior design business that operated in 
both the United States and Japan. Sometime during the summer of 2015, reports spread of a 
proposal for a “comfort women” monument in downtown San Francisco. Takahashi, who had 
only been vaguely aware of the history and believed it to have been settled long ago, felt 
panicked by the news. She did not belong to any politically active Japanese community at the 
time. In fact, she characterized Japanese people in general as being very quiet regarding 
political activism and easily pushed around as a result. Feeling vulnerable in this way, she 
contacted the nearby Japanese consulate for information about the “comfort women” redress 
movement. The consulate suggested that she google some keywords that would lead her to 
GAHT’s webpage. According to Takahashi’s recollection, the consulate was specifically 
taking care not to come off as outright supportive of GAHT or other organizations like it, 
though the consulate nevertheless seemed aware of and sympathetic to GAHT’s mission. 
Takahashi’s sense of vulnerability eased once she learned of GAHT and the coordinated efforts 
she could partake in to make sure that other activists were not spreading “false” narratives in 
American cities without challenge. 
Takahashi’s anecdote that the Japanese consulate in San Francisco actually directed her 
toward GAHT’s website implicates Japan’s official diplomatic agencies in GAHT’s grassroots 
activism. The Japanese government, notably under the nationalist leadership of Prime Minister 
Abe Shinzō, whose own suspicions about the legitimacy of the comfort women redress 
movements is well known, has on at least three occasions directly involved itself in attempts 
to prevent comfort women commemoration within the United States. First was in the month 
leading up to the House of Representatives’ vote on House Resolution 121 (HR 121) in 2007, 
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led by notable Japanese American and former representative Mike Honda. HR 121 was a 
nonbinding resolution that passed unanimously urging the Japanese government to sincerely 
apologize and provide reparations to former comfort women. To preempt the resolution, 
dozens of conservative Japanese politicians and opinion leaders placed a full-page public 
comment in the June 14, 2007 issue of the Washington Post entitled “The Facts,” which 
criticized the historical basis of the redress movement in much the same manner as I have 
already described. The second instance came a few years later when the local Japanese consul 
general approached the mayor of Palisades Park, New Jersey to ask that they remove the 
modest memorial plaque they dedicated in 2010 to the victims of imperial Japan’s sexual 
slavery.116 Finally, shortly after Mera submitted his appeal to the Supreme Court for his lawsuit 
against the City of Glendale, the Japanese government officially filed an amicus brief on behalf 
of GAHT insisting that the “comfort women issue should be handled as a matter of 
government-to-government diplomacy” and that Glendale’s actions harm Japan’s core national 
interests.117 Clearly the Abe administration is barely concealing its support for GAHT’s efforts 
to spread nationalist Japanese messages throughout the United States. 
 Even though Takahashi’s specific trigger for becoming a member of GAHT was 
geographically removed from Glendale (though she still lives in California and is a shin issei), 
her experience of seeking and finding emotional refuge in GAHT is typical for people who 
have been reacting fearfully to the comfort women redress movement as it has expanded across 
                                                 
116 Kirk Semple, “In New Jersey, Memory for ‘Comfort Women’ Deepens Old Animosity,” in The New York 
Times, May 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/nyregion/monument-in-palisades-park-nj-irritates-
japanese-officials.html. 
117 Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Koichi Mera and GAHT-US 
Corporation v. City of Glendale, No. 16-917, *ii-12 (Supreme Court of the United States), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000231732.pdf. 
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the United States. Such a fearful response is particularly noteworthy since Takahashi, along 
with most other members of GAHT, had never had confrontational or even uncomfortable 
interactions with members of the Chinese or Korean communities around her. She explicitly 
notes this in our conversation about changes she experienced once the redress movement came 
to San Francisco: 
I used to take [a] dance class, and I danced with a Chinese guy and Korean people, all these 
other people and had a good time, but now I think ‘wow, what [do] they think of me?’ Like, I 
have to think, I have a really bad feeling now, which is created by…what’s happening. It’s not 
because of them, it’s because of what I hear about the comfort women issue.118  
Similarly, friends told her that they no longer shop at their local Asian markets since they are 
owned by Chinese Americans and they worry about their safety being Japanese people.  
*** 
 In this chapter I have examined the arguments and rationales put forth by certain first-
generation Japanese immigrants for why they believe it is both inappropriate and harmful if 
Glendale were to approve the installation of a monument dedicated to the victims of the 
imperial Japanese military’s institution of sexual slavery. They consistently speak of the need 
to be objective when investigating historical records and cite certain documents out of context 
as undeniable proof for their claims that oral testimonies from survivors are fabrications 
inspired by the opportunity to harm Japan and receive money in the process. However, building 
on Iwasaki and Richter’s characterization of historical revisionism as an emotional disposition 
rather than a reflexive practice of history writing, I have suggested that these individuals’ 
apparent respect for historiographical standards should be understood less as the reflexive 
                                                 
118 Yōko Takahashi (a pseudonym). Interview by Kai Wasson. February 11, 2017. 
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evaluation of evidence characteristic of professional history-writing and more as an exercise 
in communicating personal perceptions of fear, vulnerability, and estrangement. GAHT then 
harnesses that underlying anxiety by articulating it in terms of a global threat against the nation 
of Japan, which is synonymous with a threat against the people of Japan, wherever they may 
be. Thus, while GAHT in this sense reinforces members’ sense of fear, it simultaneously 
provides a measure of relief as a space in which members can feel pride in their Japanese 
identity and heritage without accusations of being apologists for mass sexual violence against 
women.  
 My findings suggest that the emotional and social refuge these shin issei individuals 
seek and find in GAHT’s anti-monument activism provides them the psychological support 
they need to repetitively face rebuke from city councils and their constituents for their 
opposition to “comfort women” memorials and, by association, to human rights. As I explored 
in Chapter One of this thesis, American media portrayals of these activists depict them as 
irrational actors utilizing tactics that seem to only undermine their professed goals. However, 
I argue that activists’ yearning to belong to a proud Japanese community in the United States 
is the more powerful motivation than is their disagreement with the history conveyed in 
“comfort women” memorials. Therefore, regardless of whether they successfully convince the 
city council to reject proposals for a “comfort women” memorial, the act of participating in the 
opposition alongside other Japanese citizens in defense of Japan’s national honor is satisfying 
in and of itself. Additionally, persisting in the face of so much opposition may further 
encourage activists to see themselves as warriors fighting for a noble cause despite the 
unlikelihood of success, which is often the imagery neonationalistic media depicts when 
discussing Japan’s actions in World War II.  
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 In the next chapter, I turn to the supporters of the monument and their rationale for why 
the city council and residents of Glendale should proudly install the Peace Monument in their 
city’s public space. Key to understanding the stakes pro-redress activists have in this debate, I 
argue, rests on the expansion of the global women’s human rights regime, particularly since 
the 1980s. What results, I suggest, is an emotional community that is centered locally, but 
defines itself in relation to the transnational women’s human rights movement. Underneath 
proclamations of transnational solidarity with victims everywhere, however, is an underlying 
concern with American national identity that risks distracting us from the fact that sexual 
slavery did not end with the comfort women system, and that the United States is one of the 
largest consumers of trafficked humans in the contemporary world.  
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Chapter Four—Universal Human Rights and Victimhood as an Emotional 
Community 
 
In this chapter, I characterize supporters of the proposal for the Peace Monument as 
constituting another emotional community, one that is first and foremost centered locally, yet 
also oriented toward the global agenda of instituting and defending human rights, especially 
for women. Such an emotional community can exist, I suggest, because of a convergence of 
certain transnational developments. Highly publicized accounts of genocidal rape in 
international media in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with the beginning of the redress 
movement, which resulted in “comfort women” rising to international ubiquity as an iconic 
historical example of how women’s physical safety and dignity are systematically destroyed 
in wartime. One major result of reframing the redress movement from a specific, postcolonial 
movement into a human rights one was that it could now be intimately relevant to other 
aggrieved ethnonational groups waging their own redress movements. Thus, the legitimacy 
and communicability a human rights framing granted to the victims of the comfort women 
system made the issue resonate with Glendale’s city council, which was already sensitive to 
the legacy of the Armenian Genocide. However, while human rights is central in both Korean 
American activists’ own reasons for engaging in the redress movement and in understanding 
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Glendale’s receptivity to it, I suggest that a deeper motivation is also at work. This deeper 
motivation is rooted in the implicit understanding that redress activists can use the emotionality 
of representations of sexual slavery to empower themselves within the racialized American 
politics of belonging. To be clear, this is not to say that activists are cynically using redress 
politics for their own selfish gain. Rather, my findings suggest that underneath the intense 
focus on restoring the dignity of survivors and making their stories widely known lies other 
motivations concerning Korean Americans’ position within the United States.  
Below, I continue to use the lens of emotional communities to characterize the different 
factions of this controversy. I additionally draw from Samuel Moyn’s historical account of 
universal human rights as a utopian ideology that came into popular usage only in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The significant delay it took for human rights rhetoric to find support in the 
international arena, coinciding with increasing awareness of violence against women in 
wartime, help to explain why the comfort women redress movement began so many decades 
after the fact and why it expanded so rapidly. Further, I engage with Michael Rothberg’s notion 
of “multidirectional memory,” which refers to the use of traumatic events from distant places 
and times for local rights concerns and abuses. Finally, drawing from the extensive scholarship 
Sarah Soh has conducted on the “comfort women” topic will underscore my ultimate point in 
this chapter, which is that the organizations most engaged in the redress movement, even in 
the spatially, temporally, and culturally removed space of Glendale, use it as a vehicle to 
improve their positions in a politics of recognition within national and international contexts. 
By combining Rosenwein’s emotional communities with Moyn’s account of human rights and 
Soh’s work on the structural aspects of the comfort women system, I aim to create a sharp 
description of what happened in Glendale.  
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Appeals to Universal Human Rights in Glendale 
Most directly affecting the city council’s decision to approve the installation of the 
Peace Monument was their and their constituents’ shared understanding that the project was a 
dual matter of commemorating the victimization of the former “comfort women” and 
amplifying the importance of human rights as a universal, basic moral value. This is interesting 
because activists and scholars only began considering the sexual enslavement of women in the 
Japanese empire as a violation of their human rights in the early 1990s, nearly fifty years after 
the system had been dismantled and several years after the redress movement began building 
momentum. Coinciding with new and highly publicized instances of mass sexual violence and 
murder in Rwanda in the early 1990s and then again in Bosnia in the late 1990s, activists 
reconceptualized the comfort women redress movement’s goal: what had been a specific issue 
clearly located within the boundaries of the Japanese empire began to take on the much larger, 
global, and current issue of sexual violence against women during times of war. While 
undeniably more powerful in rhetoric and framing, the redefinition of the movement’s mission 
deemphasized, in some ways, the postcolonial and ethnic specificity of the movement’s 
original focus and its core demands of the Japanese government. The universalizing pull of the 
human rights agenda eventually coalesced with the specificities of “comfort women” 
survivors’ victimhood to establish a simplified, standardized narrative. This narrative is meant 
to summarize victims’ experiences, communicate them to sympathetic audiences, and 
maximize transnational public pressure on the Japanese government to provide redress. It is 
this powerful, universalizing narrative that helped make the redress movement’s goal relevant 
to city officials in Glendale. Subsequently, city officials envisioned the Peace Monument as an 
opportunity to physically mark the city’s position on the right side of history and, at the same 
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time, as upstanding defenders of human rights. Glendale’s case contrasts with that of the 
smaller town of Buena Park, whose city council voted against accepting their own Peace 
Monument by the same organization that proposed it to Glendale.  
At the public hearing on July 9, 2013, Phyllis Kim most concisely articulated this 
productive interrelation of the city’s own moral code with a human rights repertoire conceived 
of as universal and transnational. Kim was first in line to present. In her role as Director of the 
Korean American Forum of California (KAFC), she addressed the global and local dimensions 
of valuing human rights:  
…[this] is an issue that speaks to everyone, it’s a universal issue, you know, not specific to any 
one ethnicity, but for all women. Especially we are concerned about the sexual violence that is 
still happening in this world, especially during the time of war. This is an education piece for 
our younger generations and I am really proud to live in the city that has taken a bold step to 
speak to the public about correct history and to teach ourselves not to have the same atrocity 
repeat itself in the future.119 
As in many of her utterances and writings elsewhere, Kim intertwines three discrete claims. 
She asserts that the comfort women issue is just one variant of the victimization of women 
regardless of ethnicity. Additionally, she links wartime sexual violence against women in the 
past to sexual violence in the present. Though the time limit for public speakers prevented her 
from further elaborating on this point, linking past sexual violence to contemporary sexual 
violence reflects the importance of intimate understandings of history for the present. That is 
to say, without broad historical awareness specifically of the sexual slavery these women 
suffered—and recognizing it precisely as sexual slavery rather than as prostitution—such an 
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atrocity could easily be repeated. And, finally, she connects Glendale’s own moral courage to 
recognize and honor the victims of human rights violations with what should be a global act 
of moral courage.  
Other than being the Director of KAFC, Kim is a certified court interpreter for Korean 
language speakers, a resident of Glendale, and a self-identified Korean American woman who, 
while born in South Korea, has lived in the United States for most of her life. She is also the 
person primarily responsible for Glendale’s Peace Monument. By the time of the special city 
council meeting, she had promoted local awareness of the redress movement, raised funds for 
the monument’s construction, and worked to link the conversation on comfort women to other 
conversations about human rights issues in other communities, including participating in a 
panel discussion on how to commemorate the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust.120 
Kim’s leadership regarding the Peace Monument project earned her the respect of many 
influential individuals throughout the state.  Democratic State Representative Adam Schiff, for 
instance, selected her as one of three Women of the Year for 2017. The other two women were 
Lena Kortoshian, an Armenian American woman who has worked as a mathematics educator 
and principal at various local schools, and Betty Porto, a Cuban American woman who runs a 
highly successful bakery and has supported organizations that provide children and others in 
the community with healthy food.121 This selection, particularly the celebration of Kim’s 
accomplishments regarding Glendale’s Peace Monument alongside those of other outstanding 
women in California’s 28th congressional district (including the cities of Glendale, Burbank, 
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and Pasadena), is but one indicator of Glendale’s consistent public support for humanitarianism 
and human rights.    
City councilmembers similarly positioned Glendale and the Peace Monument project 
within the purview of universal human rights. Throughout the process of proposing the 
monument project to the city council, hearing public comments on the proposal, voting on it, 
and the media coverage of the controversy, human rights were and continue to be frequently 
invoked. In large part due to the specific ethnic composition of Glendale and these ethnic 
communities’ struggles for recognition of their own tragic histories, which I briefly touched 
upon in Chapter Two, Glendale residents and officials alike consistently conceived of human 
rights as fundamental to their city’s moral fabric. In effect, the notion of human rights 
functioned as a focal concept at the core of an emotional community, one that local residents 
felt Japanese opponents to the monument were challenging. They derisively labelled these 
opponents as “history deniers” who bear the real shame in this matter.  
For example, councilmember Zareh Sinanyan reported that in the week leading up to 
the public hearing, he and the other councilmembers had received hundreds of emails from 
Japanese individuals claiming that this problem was a diplomatic one between South Korea 
and Japan, and that Glendale had no legal right to intervene. Sinanyan, an Armenian American 
actively involved in the Armenian redress movement against the government of Turkey, 
prefaced his subsequent statement by describing the constant resentment and anger he feels as 
the grandson of a survivor of the Armenian Genocide. He also pointed out the remarkable 
parallels between those emails and Turkey’s strategies to deflect any criticism of its own past 
atrocities. Most importantly, Sinanyan repeatedly emphasized that commemorating “comfort 
women” history was neither primarily a diplomatic nor a legal issue, but a moral one: 
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Again, this is a moral issue. We are taking a meaningful step to show our moral support, sense 
of camaraderie, and our sharing of the pain that our Korean American brothers and sisters feel 
about this issue. It’s very simple. That’s why I’m in support of it. And I’m strongly in support 
of it. If anything after today I’m even more strongly in support of it.122 
As a moral issue, that is, a question that strikes at the heart of what a society deems to be 
fundamentally right or wrong, he insisted that Glendale’s involvement in this matter is 
naturally legitimate. He took particular offense to the prevalent argument that victimized 
women had been ordinary prostitutes, not sex slaves, and that prostitutes deserved what they 
got. The anger and disgust he evoked by describing such a claim as offensive to himself 
personally, to Koreans, and to anyone else with a moral compass reflected the boundary 
between the two emotional communities in conflict over the proposal for the monument. In 
other words, the unsympathetic sentiment against survivors that Sinanyan was reacting against 
violated his own (and the council’s) emotional code of conduct regarding the victims of 
atrocities. Encountering it in emails and in person only deepened his support for the monument. 
Historical technicalities were irrelevant.   
 Differing in tone with Sinanyan, though agreeing with his sentiment, councilmember 
Laura Friedman attempted to reach across the proverbial aisle to opponents of the proposal. 
Her statements, which I paraphrase for readability, asserted that, regardless of whether the 
women were technically prostitutes at the time, or whether their parents voluntarily sold them 
into the system, or whether some women did receive some amount of money—all of which the 
monument’s opponents had variously argued that day—she declared that none of that should 
matter once one recognizes that teenage girls had been turned into sexual servants for the 
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Japanese military.123 Regardless of the technicalities, she emphasized, that undisputed fact in 
and of itself constitutes a tragedy and that recognizing it as a tragedy is something that 
“everybody should be able to get behind morally.”124 Again, Friedman, though intentionally 
using a less combative tone of voice, nonetheless implies that a certain emotional reaction to 
this monument and the historical narrative it promotes is incontestable, that reacting in any 
other way is immoral and unbecoming of basic human values. Thus, Kim’s, Sinanyan’s, and 
Friedman’s statements, along with other public speakers’ statements, repeatedly invoked the 
moral authority of human rights to rationalize Glendale’s acceptance of the Peace Monument 
proposal. In the minds of the city council and its constituents, human rights concepts were 
common sense and a powerful currency in the controversy circling the Peace Monument.  
 Glendale’s enthusiastic embrace of the Peace Monument contrasts markedly with the 
response of nearby Buena Park, a town with an overall population less than half of Glendale’s. 
Phyllis Kim and KAFC proposed the same exact project to Buena Park’s city council around 
the same time in 2013. They convinced Miller Oh, a first-generation Korean American city 
councilmember, to add the commemoration project to the city council’s agenda on July 23, 
2013.125 The council did not initially vote on the proposal since another councilmember, Art 
Brown, requested more time to research the matter before making his decision. In the 
meantime, city councilmembers’ inboxes were flooded with emails from Japan denouncing the 
project, just as had happened in Glendale. One month after Oh brought the issue to the council’s 
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attention, Brown and two other councilmembers, Steve Berry and Mayor Beth Swift, 
announced their vote against the proposal.  
While none of the councilmembers questioned the validity of the history as presented 
by KAFC, three of the five had misgivings about the monument’s placement in their city. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 10 percent of Buena Park’s residents are 
racially Korean, compared to 4.7 percent of Glendale’s residents being racially Korean, though 
both percentages equate to around 9,000 people.126 Glendale’s councilmember Zareh Sinanyan 
weighed in on Buena Park’s deliberations and promoted the project as a symbol of the city’s 
support of its Korean residents.127 Buena Park councilmember Oh insisted that the symbolism 
of justice and peace should be sufficient in demonstrating the monument’s appropriateness for 
the city, regardless of the number of its Korean residents.128 Nevertheless, three of Buena 
Park’s councilmembers remained unconvinced that they should willingly step into this 
controversy. Mayor Swift agreed with the emails she received from opponents arguing that it 
was inappropriate for Buena Park to involve itself in an “international dispute” between the 
Japanese and South Korean governments.129 Steve Berry was concerned that taxpayer money 
would be requisitioned if the controversial monument were vandalized, despite KAFC’s 
insistence that they would be responsible for all installation and maintenance costs.130 Finally, 
councilmember Brown, who noted that his father was an abused prisoner of war held by Japan 
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during WWII, stated the following on August 30, 2013: “While I have sympathy for victims 
of past and present wars and conflicts throughout the world, I do not support placing memorials 
throughout the city for any and all.”131 In short, these three councilmembers believed the 
monument to be too irrelevant to the city to warrant its placement in public space.  
Glendale’s city council evinced no such trepidation regarding the monument’s 
relevance to Glendale, even if the victimization occurred in another place and time. Akin to 
Art Brown’s own claim to victimhood at (imperial) Japan’s hands, at the July 9 public hearing 
in Glendale, councilmember Quintero responded to opponents’ comments in part by citing 
Japanese wartime actions in Bataan that resulted in massive casualties among American and 
Filipino prisoners of war.132 With this historical claim, Quintero was partly suggesting, as 
American op-eds related to this controversy have likewise often noted, that Americans have 
also suffered at the hands of wartime Japan, and that many individual Americans maintain this 
grievance to the present day. Underpinned by the transnational scope of human rights rhetoric, 
such statements broaden the boundaries of the “victims of Japan” category to include 
Americans, a strategy Quintero used to justify the relevance of a “comfort women” 
commemorative project in Glendale. Additionally, as I described above, councilmember 
Sinanyan emphasized that his support for the monument only strengthened in the face of the 
opposition and that he took personal offense at much of what opponents had argued regarding 
the history of the “comfort women” system.  
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The contrast between these two cases demonstrates how Buena Park’s leadership 
consciously decided to forgo supporting the expanding “comfort women” redress movement 
by taking the position that local governments should not play a role in contestations over 
transnational morality. On the other hand, Glendale’s city council made the explicit decision 
to position itself within the transnational conversation on Japan’s wartime system of sexual 
slavery and cast itself as a staunch defender of women’s human rights. The social, ethnic, and 
moral self-imagining in Glendale, while perhaps not entirely unique (since several other 
American cities have also accepted replicas of the Peace Monument), was anchored strongly 
enough in the transnational ideals of human rights to overcome both the considerable 
opposition they faced and the historical specificities of the “comfort women” issue that could 
also lead one to conclude its irrelevance to American towns. Not only did the city council see 
this commemorative project as relevant to Glendale as a whole, its relevance was exceedingly 
obvious. As Laura Friedman noted, “everybody [emphasis added] should be able to get behind 
[this project] morally.”133 
How Sexual Slavery Became a Human Rights Violation 
Equating the “comfort women” phenomenon with human rights was not always so 
commonsensical. In fact, given the early history of the notion of “crimes against humanity,” it 
is not obvious at all that participants in the controversy in Glendale would employ the language 
of human rights. Human rights were first instituted on an international level and the notion of 
“crimes against humanity” coined immediately following the end of WWII. Despite calls to 
respect “correct” history on both sides of the debate in Glendale, one historical fact that went 
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unmentioned at the public hearing was that the Allied powers never prosecuted Japan’s sexual 
violence against (mostly) Asian women technically as a crime during the proceedings at the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trials. The charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMFTE) in part defined “crimes against humanity” as:  
…murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.134 
While recent scholarship has emphasized that Allied prosecutors during the trials did, in fact, 
present evidence of Japanese military sexual violence against Asian women, they ultimately 
did not include sexual slavery in any convictions of “crimes against humanity.”135 In other 
words, while “military atrocities” and civilian massacres were newly considered to be “crimes 
against humanity,” prosecutors did not consider mass rape in warfare to be criminal despite 
the availability of pertinent evidence. In a revealing exception, however, most of the evidence 
of sexual slavery presented during the trials concerned the sexual enslavement of thirty-five 
Dutch women during Japan’s occupation of Indonesia. As Carol Gluck noted, some Japanese 
soldiers were tried in Batavian courts for forcing Dutch women prisoners of war into their 
prostitution system. However, those soldiers were tried for violating Western racial boundaries 
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rather than for sexual exploitation per se.136 In the end, judgements against convicting anyone 
for sexual slavery suggests that women did not necessarily belong to the category of “human” 
in the conception of crimes against “humanity.” Furthermore, as Laura Hein posited, the 
greater attention paid to white victims of rape similarly suggests that internal boundaries 
existed within “humanity” along both racial and gender axes in the immediate postwar period 
as far as which victims deserved recognition and sympathy.137    
As I mentioned earlier, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. However, they were not conceived nor 
did they function in the 1940s the way they do today. Samuel Moyn explains how human rights 
were, in their original conceptualization in the 1940s, dead on arrival because they did not 
contain a pragmatic program for achieving their moral vision for the world, a world free of 
imperial domination.138 Put differently, the powers that be (i.e., the Allies) were not yet 
interested in dismantling empire, despite the lofty rhetoric of a new, freer world order. Human 
rights would remain peripheral to world politics, however, subordinated to Cold War political 
agendas and heightening demands for decolonization across the world. They would remain an 
uninspiring and marginal utopian language until the 1970s and 1980s, when a confluence of 
global political shifts led to widespread disillusion with prior utopian ideologies that had 
promised a free way of life, but had only led to more blood and death.139 An internationalism 
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centered on individual rights then rose to fill the void, though the challenge of actually 
implementing and enforcing them remained a central obstacle to their realization in the world.  
The South Korean redress movement began in the 1970s as a women’s campaign 
against international sex tourism.140 Specifically targeting male Japanese visitors, the 
campaign evolved over two decades into a postcolonial dispute revolving around opposing 
views of the legitimacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea and the proper way to represent that 
history. This postcolonial dispute then escalated throughout the 1980s with the first of several 
textbook controversies in which the Japanese government approved a middle school history 
textbook that omitted references to the comfort women, thereby inspiring more rounds of 
criticisms against Japan for its unrepentant attitudes toward its past aggression.141 “Comfort 
women” came to epitomize (South) Korea’s grievances against Japan by the early 1990s in 
part because of this trajectory, though other global forces coincided with this trajectory to 
transform it into a transnational human rights movement.  
International media coverage of the genocidal conflicts in Rwanda in the early 1990s 
and then again in Bosnia in the late 1990s greatly accelerated the global embrace not only of 
discourse on human rights, but also on human rights specifically for women. Graphic reporting 
on the violence produced a sense of urgency that the international community needed to give 
greater teeth to human rights laws so they could actually be pragmatically implemented and 
enforced. Further, that women were prime targets in these genocidal conflicts catalyzed 
transnational feminist movements in particular to strive to instill the notion of “women’s 
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human rights” as a fundamental international moral value. They argued that human rights for 
women would make wartime sexual violence against women visible, unacceptable, as well as 
transform the “shame of women” into the “crime of men,” as the Japanese feminist Ueno 
Chizuko once described.142 The burgeoning redress movement for imperial Japan’s wartime 
victims of sexual slavery was partially informed by and coincided with the global surge in 
demand for women’s human rights, leading to a rapid expansion of scholarship and an 
escalation of political discourse on “comfort women” throughout the 1990s. 
United Nations representatives and South Korean redress activists quickly joined forces 
to make the comfort women issue the iconic historical example of the systematic sexual 
violation of women in wartime. By raising global awareness of the history of the comfort 
women system, U.N. activists such as Radhika Coomaraswamy sought to emphasize the 
consequences of not having a legal framework specifically protecting women by bolstering 
that claim with historical examples. Greater global awareness of the redress movement, in turn, 
mobilized more organizations and polities to pressure the Japanese government to apologize 
and provide reparations to survivors. Toward that end, Coomaraswamy, who worked as a U.N. 
special rapporteur of violence against women from 1994 to 2003, published a research report 
in 1996 in which she described the comfort women system as “military sexual slavery” where 
women suffered “multiple rapes on [an] everyday basis and severe physical abuse in 
wartime.”143 The following year, Gay J. McDougall, also a special rapporteur, published 
another report that took her characterizations of the system a step further by portraying the 
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brothels as “rape camps” and “rape centers.”144 By framing the issue in language that 
conformed to the U.N.’s criteria for officially recognizing the violation of women’s human 
rights, both Coomaraswamy’s and McDougall’s reports established previously absent 
institutional support for survivors’ right, in an explicitly legal sense of the word, to claim 
adequate compensation for the personal damages they suffered.  
The U.N.’s establishment of institutional support for victims of sexual slavery through 
the legal terminology of human rights violations undermined two legal precedents that had 
long forestalled redress claims by victims of sexual violence. First, as I mentioned earlier, was 
the Tokyo Trials’ own implicit acceptance of mass sexual violence and sexual slavery as an 
inevitable and tolerable aspect of modern warfare. Second is the 1965 normalization treaty 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea, which stipulated that, in exchange for substantial 
economic aid loans from Japan to South Korea, all legal issues and claims regarding the 
relationship between imperial Japan and South Korea were to be null and void. Thus, 
Coomaraswamy’s and McDougall’s characterization of the comfort women system with the 
language of “rape” and “sexual slavery” were attempts to strengthen survivors’ demands for 
restitution from the Japanese government by incorporating comfort women discourse into the 
legal and legitimizing rhetoric of human rights, which then had the effect of rendering the 
redress movement more understandable and relatable to audiences beyond East Asia.  
I agree with Sarah Soh’s scholarship, that, despite the enormous, positive impact these 
reports and reframing have had on illuminating this history for the world, they have not 
prevented the rise of a simplistic victim-perpetrator binary that obscures structures of violence 
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against women larger than the specific system masterminded by the imperial Japanese 
government. In other words, the gendered social structures that led to the comfort women 
system are far from unique to Japan. Recognizing this, one can then see how the scope of 
responsibility for the comfort women system, while undeniably including Japan, reaches 
beyond it as well. Consider, for example, the South Korean government’s longstanding 
tepidness regarding the comfort women redress movement. Hyunah Yang discussed how South 
Korean nationalism contributed to victims’ silence after the war. According to her, South 
Korea’s government judged it to be a “matter of the past” (kwagŏsa), implying that it saw no 
benefit to revisiting it in the present, though it changed its tune in the 1990s.145 This dismissal 
likely stemmed from the predictable impulse to ignore the unsavory fact that, during the 
Korean War as well as the Vietnam War, the Korean military availed itself of its own “special 
comfort units,” which has garnered little public attention.146 Additionally, ever since the 
Korean War, the camp towns surrounding American military bases have hosted adult 
entertainment industries populated by Korean women to service American troops. While 
questions about the agency of these sex workers are too complicated to explore here, parallels 
between camp town prostitution and the “comfort women” system were made apparent by a 
2014 lawsuit in which over one hundred South Korean women sued their own government for 
its role in directing women to work as prostitutes for the U.S. military since the 1960s.147 In 
1965, after signing the bilateral treaty normalizing relations with Japan, the Korean 
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government even promoted sex tourism for Japanese men in the name of national economic 
development.148 These examples are not meant to exonerate Japan of any responsibility or to 
defend it from the censure it deserves. I am rather attempting to point out that, as Soh explores 
more fully elsewhere, the less obvious mechanisms of class exploitation combined with a 
legacy of sexually commodifying women risks being obscured if we only view the comfort 
women system as a war crime that Japan committed against Koreans (and many other peoples) 
rather than one instance of a more insidious problem that has continued to this day.149   
Comfort Women Redress Trapped in the Quicksand of Nationalism 
The 1990s were a major turning point for the redress movement and witness to the rapid 
surge of international demand that Japan address its sordid history honestly. Although initially 
met with predictable resistance, this international pressure did succeed in sparking a series of 
apologies from the Japanese government. While it is not my intention here to chart out the 
debate on what exactly convinced Japanese government officials to begin apologizing, in 1993 
then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei issued the now infamous Kōno statement. This was 
the first official Japanese admission that, among other details, the Japanese military was 
“directly or indirectly involved in the establishment and management of the comfort 
stations.”150 The careful wording of the various components of this statement, however, 
seemed to only intensify the indignation expressed among South Koreans and sympathetic 
audiences worldwide. Contending with internal dissension between conservatives and 
progressives, the Japanese government’s diplomatic efforts to address the now bilateral 
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controversy resulted in the establishment of the “Asian Peace and Friendship Fund for 
Women” (also known as the “Asian Women’s Fund” AWF) which, while being set up and 
operated with public funds, would collect private donations for the survivors while additionally 
distributing a signed letter of apology from the Prime Minister. Japanese progressives involved 
in the design of the AWF, most prominently professor of international law Ōnuma Yasuaki, 
lauded its hybrid public-private design as a vehicle that more accurately represented the 
reconciliatory desires of the Japanese public than a Diet resolution could.151  While 
conservative nationalists in Japan were, from the beginning, opposed to any and all admissions 
of Japanese responsibility, even some proponents of the redress movement read the AWF as 
the government equivocating on its legal responsibility to provide reparations. 
Most leaders of the comfort women redress movement in South Korea took a hardline, 
dogmatic stance against the AWF and other components of Japan’s attempts at apologizing. 
Most representative of this refusal to accept any apology is, to a large extent, the Korean 
Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter, “Korean 
Council”), one of the main activist organizations advocating for redress on behalf of 
survivors.152 Despite the Korean Council’s criticisms of the AWF, in 1997 seven South Korean 
survivors accepted AWF funds.153 In response, the Korean Council launched another fund-
raising campaign to lobby the Kim Dae Jung administration, which resulted in the Korean 
government paying approximately $26,000 in support money to each of about 140 survivors, 
excluding the seven who accepted money from the AWF. Soh recounts the story of one of 
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these seven survivor-recipients, Pak Pok-sun (1991-2005), who became the target of death 
threats and hate calls for eight years until her death for going against the Korean Council’s 
position.154 Pak was also implicated in angry Korean rhetoric characterizing Japan as 
performing a “second rape” of survivors with the temptation of money through the AWF.155 
South Korean survivors who wished to receive the Korean government’s payments had to sign 
a pledge that they would never receive money from the AWF.156 This is just one potent 
example of how national identity politics and the logic of restoring honor to victims can 
override the individual wishes of survivors and even lead to their outright harassment. 
Rumi Sakamoto has made a similar point about the appropriation of female suffering 
for male-centric nationalist discourse. Regarding the “comfort women” issue in Korea, she 
mentioned how it is often configured as “national shame” and followed by logic such as “we 
must rescue our women and our history from the Japanese.”157 Of course, this appropriation is 
not unique to South Korea. In Japan, conservatives argued that Japan should never apologize 
so that future Japanese could be proud of themselves as a nation. Japanese liberals countered 
that Japan should apologize in order to be a proud nation. Both positions, Sakamoto rightly 
asserts, are forms of nationalism that have little to do with the suffering of victims. She goes 
on to explain that Japanese and Korean feminists have positioned themselves away from 
nationalism, instead choosing to link themselves with the international movement of human 
rights and global feminism. However, my own research suggests that feminism and human 
rights, particularly as applied to the comfort women redress movement, has nevertheless 
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succumbed to appropriation for identity politics as the movement has travelled across the 
world.  
Glendale on the “Right Side of History” 
 In Glendale, the idea for a monument dedicated to Japan’s wartime sex slaves first 
germinated in 2011, at a meeting in which Glendale’s city council began debating whether to 
incorporate monuments dedicated to its sister cities in their Central Park.158 By that time, media 
representations of the comfort women problem had settled into a neat victim-perpetrator binary 
portraying Japan as the unrepentant perpetrator and South Korea—or sometimes women in 
general—as the innocent victim(s). Short news articles about the subject matter frequently omit 
the fact that many actors within the Japanese government and among Japanese citizens have 
done much to elevate awareness of what happened during the war and to make amends, which 
is not to say that those efforts are beyond criticism or that they should be deemed sufficient. 
The simplicity of the narrative in which imperial Japan committed atrocities against hapless 
women is of course not untrue, but it ignores the enormous complexity of how crimes against 
humanity are waged, reifies responsibility, and fuels simple narratives of collective blame, 
which tend to devolve into endless politicking over collective responsibility and the “sincerity” 
of national apologies. Regardless, the simplicity of this narrative and its framing as a human 
rights movement made the proposal for the monument attractive to Glendale’s leadership. In 
effect, the project to build the Peace Monument and the controversy that would become 
attached to it functioned as an opportunity for local redress activists and the city council to 
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reaffirm for themselves their own status as a cosmopolitan and morally upstanding society on 
the right side of history. In the end, however, survivors themselves, even if physically present 
at the unveiling ceremony, were obscured by such identity politics.  
 The particular entanglement of historical memories I have been discussing in the 
context of Glendale reflects Michael Rothberg’s work on “multidirectional memory,” in which 
a temporally and spatially distant traumatic event serves as the basis for addressing local rights 
issues and abuses.159 He contrasts this multidirectional memory against “competitive 
memory,” a model that understands public recognition of collective memories as a scarce 
resource in which ethnonational groups compete to display their own historical grievances at 
the cost of public recognition for other groups.  
My research on Glendale’s Peace Monument controversy, however, demonstrates how 
these two models of memory are not mutually exclusive. For example, while city 
councilmembers and other supporters rhetorically linked the comfort women history with 
contemporary human trafficking phenomena, it is not clear that the Peace Monument has 
played any role in changing how the City of Glendale combats human trafficking. The 
monument can simultaneously be seen as an example of Korean Americans’ greater 
involvement in local organizations and government. Since the 1992 Los Angeles riots, when 
the police abandoned Korean American communities, those communities have responded by 
asserting themselves in the public sphere to end their social invisibility in American society in 
the hope that they would be recognized by others as authentic Americans. In the shadow of 
this local, distinctly American heritage, the comfort women monument project helped 
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demonstrate Korean American savvy when navigating civil bureaucracy and appealing to an 
American sensibility of honoring the victims of human rights abuses. Furthermore, as an issue 
that can speak to human rights issues everywhere, the symbols and history of the comfort 
women could also strengthen the grievances and memory work of the Armenian American 
community in Glendale. With the Korean American and Armenian American communities 
mutually supporting each other’s claims to victimhood, they reinforce each other’s claims to 
recognition as good Americans on the right side of history.  
 At the same time, however, the Peace Monument controversy also evinces a 
competitive model of collective historical memory. GAHT, that shin issei organization 
dedicated to opposing comfort women commemoration in the United States, proclaims on its 
website that nefarious forces are vigorously working to tarnish Japan’s national reputation and 
that the comfort women monument in Glendale is one such example.160 One of Rothberg’s 
own examples of competitive memory centered on how the Holocaust Museum in Washington 
physically occupied space that could otherwise have been used to preserve the memory of 
African American history, something more obviously relevant to American society. The 
competitive dimension of Glendale’s case is markedly different. Rather than the Peace 
Monument physically crowding out the potential for a monument dedicated to an example of 
Japanese victimization, such as the suffering of atomic bomb victims, GAHT members 
maintain that the Peace Monument promotes a falsified history that harms Japan and Japanese 
people. And yet, declaring one’s own victimhood on the basis of negating another group’s 
claim to victimhood fails to adhere to the cosmopolitan spirit and rhetoric of human rights 
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morality. As such, at least within the local context of Glendale, GAHT’s insistence that 
Japanese people are the true victims of the current situation comes across to self-identified 
Americans as not only unconvincing, but morally offensive. Such arguments nevertheless 
reaffirmed for other shin issei in the room that they are all engaged in the noble mission of 
defending Japan’s honor. In this sense, while they present arguments in public as if they are 
trying to convince people who do not already agree with them, my research suggests that these 
utterances function more as a show of solidarity with other shin issei rather than as an attempt 
to change anyone else’s mind.  
*** 
 In Chapter Four, I examined pro-redress actors’ arguments and rationales through the 
same “emotional communities” lens as I did with anti-redress activists. By exploring the 
emotional dimension of this public debate underneath arguments over which historical 
interpretation is the “correct” one, I demonstrated how transnational historical discourse can 
be used for local politics and identity construction. I also reviewed how wartime sexual slavery 
transformed from being considered an inevitable side-effect of war to being considered a 
“crime against humanity” that should be criminalized to prevent it from happening again. The 
global proliferation of human rights discourse, and the association of “comfort women” with 
that discourse, helped make the cause of women from the other side of the world who were 
victimized in a war there seventy years prior appear intimately relevant to the city of Glendale, 
California. This chapter also illustrates how what on the surface appears to be a 
historiographical debate in the public sphere is simultaneously—and often more potently—an 
arena for collective identity construction in local, national, and transnational registers. That is, 
pro-redress activists and actors in Glendale were positioning themselves within a transnational 
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debate on an egregious case of sexual violence against women, a national debate on Korean 
Americans’ belonging to the U.S., and a local debate on Glendale’s moral valuing of human 
rights. While history was invoked to bolster these performative claims on (Asian) American 
identity, they ignored those historical details that would have tarnished America’s image as a 
land where human rights are stalwartly defended. Although the transnational expansion of 
discourse on “comfort women” has had an undeniably positive impact on general awareness 
of history, the obscuring effects on this progress of national appropriation is a real risk I have 
attempted to highlight.  
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Conclusion 
The city of Glendale unveiled the Peace Monument on July 30, 2013, in spite of 
demands to reject it by Japanese individuals living across southern California and in Japan. Its 
design features a 1,100-pound bronze statue of a young girl, dressed in Korean clothes, sitting 
in a chair next to another, empty chair, with bare feet, roughly shorn hair, clenched fists, a bird 
on her shoulder, and a black mosaic shadow in the shape of an elderly woman, all of which are 
meant to signify the violence and abandonment young Korean girls faced in the comfort 
women system. It also speaks to the hope the few remaining survivors have in their old age for 
a meaningful apology and that future generations will not forget what happened. The Peace 
Monument also features two 
plaques: one that outlines in bullet-
points each symbolic element; the 
another, more typical of 
monuments, conveys the 
sponsoring community’s 
intentions in three parts (see image 
3).161 First, it dedicates the 
monument to the more than 
200,000 women “who were 
removed from their homes” in the 
ten different countries from which the women came. Second, it celebrates Glendale’s 
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proclamation in 2012 that July 30 is “Comfort Women Day” and expresses gratitude that the 
United States Congress passed House Resolution 121 on July 30, 2007, urging “the Japanese 
Government to accept historical responsibility for these crimes.” It concludes by expressing 
the hope that such violations of human rights will not recur.  
With the reelection of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2012, the Japanese government 
has proactively involved itself in combating the spread of “comfort women” commemorative 
practices anywhere in the world. Having largely succeeded in suppressing such activities 
within Japan, the government has turned its focus elsewhere, most notably the United States. 
Upon realizing that the small town of Palisades Park, New Jersey had built a “comfort women” 
memorial in public space, they sent official representatives to request that the town remove the 
memorial because it was based on “false” history and it harmed the U.S.-Japanese relationship. 
Despite their efforts having backfired, they nevertheless persisted each time another American 
municipality began considering building their own monuments at the behest of their Korean 
American residents. In Glendale’s case, Japanese opposition garnered the most media 
attention. Further, largely negative media coverage of such commemorative acts within 
Japanese media fed into a fear experienced by diasporic Japanese immigrants in the U.S. that 
American public sentiment was turning against them as a community, thereby necessitating 
their mobilization in a fight against the spread of “fabricated” history designed to turn the 
world against Japan.  
Each time these grassroots shin issei activists speak out in public against “comfort 
women” memorials, they almost always inadvertently convince the local city council that 
building a memorial is indeed the appropriate action to take. Japanese activists’ increasingly 
 98 
enthusiastic embrace of the same counterproductive tactics makes one question why they 
would pursue the same strategy repeatedly despite continuous failures to prevent the spread of 
“comfort women” memorials and general awareness of the history. I argue in this thesis that 
grassroots activists’ ostensible goal of preventing the spread of such memorials or removing 
from public space those that have already been built is secondary to a more fundamental, if 
implicit, attraction to strengthening a communal network based on pride in being Japanese 
even if they do not live in Japan. Through my interviews and analysis of news media and 
Glendale’s city records, I have sought to use an analysis of emotional performance to 
demonstrate this underlying and, indeed, fundamentally human desire for community, 
particularly among those who fear that violence may be directed toward themselves or their 
children in the near future.  
When considering the sort of place Glendale is, as I did in Chapter Two, one must take 
into account the diverse ethnic communities that see Glendale as their home. Particularly with 
a large and politically active Armenian American population that cares deeply about obtaining 
redress for the Armenian Genocide, the city’s leadership was logically more attuned to human 
rights rhetoric than other cities in the region. Thus, it seemed only natural to Glendale’s 
leadership to accept Phyllis Kim’s proposed donation of a “comfort women” monument since 
it could benefit the city in several ways. It would improve Glendale’s relationship with its 
South Korean sister cities, the representatives of which were supportive of Kim’s proposal. It 
would also enhance Glendale’s global profile as the first city outside of South Korea to host a 
replica of the original and highly controversial “Girl Statue of Peace” (in Korean, Pyŏnghwaui 
sonyŏsang), which was originally built in South Korea across the street from the Japanese 
embassy in Seoul. In part because of this association with the monument in Seoul, several 
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weeks prior to the monument’s unveiling in Glendale, the shin issei Japanese immigrants in 
California attended the city’s public hearing to air their vehement opposition to the proposal. 
While this local opposition cannot be understood outside of the larger, international context of 
South Korean-Japanese relations, my research in Glendale suggests that more personal 
motivations are also crucial for understanding why so many people could oppose a monument 
that calls for a future without sexual slavery.  
Inspired by Erika Doss’s work on the emotional lives of monuments in the 
contemporary United States and Barbara Rosenwein’s conception of “emotional 
communities,” I employed these concepts and analytic privileging of emotional 
communication to uncover the more visceral motivations of redress and anti-redress activists. 
For anti-redress activists, the most common theme in their arguments in the Glendale public 
arena was that the narrative presented by the statue, and by the sort of group funding it, was 
based on misconstrued history and a reliance on evidence that has no documentary basis. I 
have argued in this thesis, however, that this controversy has little to do with a commitment to 
historiographical standards. More clearly communicating the underlying reality of the 
controversy were public speakers’ emotional appeals, such as when several women insisted 
that an “anti-Japanese” monument in the city’s public space would endanger their own and 
their children’s wellbeing. Their equating criticism of the imperial Japanese government with 
an attack on their own personal dignity reflects how deeply they identified as Japanese 
nationals, even though most of them have lived in the United States for nearly half their lives, 
have married Americans, and have raised children, even grandchildren, in the U.S.  
My findings suggest that these shin issei are attracted to the anti-monument movement 
in part because of an underlying sense of alienation from American society, an alienation that 
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is worsening as more communities build their own monuments dedicated to “comfort women.” 
As the first American city to loudly step into the transnational debate on Japan’s responsibility 
for its wartime system of sexual slavery, Glendale’s acceptance of the monument provided a 
rallying point around which otherwise physically scattered Japanese immigrants in California 
could coalesce. Many of these shin issei individuals found emotional refuge in Kōichi Mera’s 
Global Alliance for Historical Truth. Collectively, they attempted to convince Glendale’s city 
council to reconsider the proposal, but they only managed to further convince councilmembers 
of the importance of the monument. Based on the emotional satisfaction GAHT members 
experience defending Japan from what they believe are false accusations, I contend that the 
organization’s primary function is to facilitate the performance of publicly defending Japan, 
and to target that performance at other shin issei living in the U.S. Convincing their opponents 
is not as emphasized, nor do GAHT members realistically expect it to happen.   
 Those who did express support for the monument include, most notably, Phyllis Kim, 
fellow members of the Korean American Forum of California (KAFC), Glendale’s city 
council, and a few unaffiliated residents of Glendale, all of whom saw the monument as 
obviously appropriate as a symbol of women’s human rights. However, it is not obvious why 
Korean and other Americans would care so much about an atrocity perpetrated by another 
power against another people across the ocean nearly seventy years prior to the proposal for 
the monument. I argued in Chapter Four that the confluence of the originally postcolonial, 
bilateral redress movement with the burgeoning global women’s human rights movement 
helped reframe the comfort women issue as universally relevant. This major development 
suddenly granted survivors of the “comfort women” system a legitimacy they had not 
possessed prior to the 1990s, and discourse on their victimization proliferated as a result. This 
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is of course not to say that no one could possibly care about the history of the “comfort women” 
without a human rights framework in place, but such a framework did play a large role in 
promoting research into and discussion of this particularly horrifying episode of human history.  
 That the various boundaries around “comfort women” victimhood—such as the time, 
place, ethnicity, and perpetrator—could be overcome and allies galvanized as easily as KAFC 
did speaks to the power of working within a given emotional regime. The emotional work the 
Peace Monument accomplishes parallels how other monuments in the U.S. also operate. In her 
analysis of contemporary American commemorative culture, Erika Doss takes the stance that, 
in the context of heightened anxieties about national identity and change, American 
commemorative culture has become centered around affects such as shame, grief, or anger, 
rather than the awe for great people or great events that previous eras of commemorative 
culture centered on.162 As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, shame first and foremost 
was indeed the central emotion that fueled the Glendale controversy. The Peace Monument 
also operates along the same lines as Michael North’s reading of monuments like the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial, which “achieve their aesthetic distinction and their emotional power from 
their political complexity” and “place their viewers in a public space that is articulated in terms 
of political controversy so that to view the piece is not simply to experience space but also to 
enter a debate.”163 
 Indeed, since the Glendale controversy, communities in five other municipalities across 
the United States have built their own “comfort women” monuments, including Fairfax 
(Virginia), Union City (New Jersey), Southfield (Michigan), San Francisco (California), and 
                                                 
162 Erika Doss, Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America (The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 46.  
163 Michael North, “The Public as Sculpture: From Heavenly City to Mass Ornament,” Critical Inquiry 16:4 
(Summer 1990): 860-879.  
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Atlanta (Georgia). Not only did KAFC’s strategy in Glendale demonstrate that “comfort 
women” redress could be waged successfully in the United States, it also provided a model for 
how to frame redress activism to utilize emotional communication effectively to galvanize 
otherwise apathetic observers ignorant about this dimension of the Asia Pacific War. 
Unfortunately, the Peace Monument’s affective force and narrow focus on Japan as the 
unrepentant perpetrator obscures the larger picture in exchange for a simplified, easy-to-digest 
narrative. In Glendale’s case, the Korean American community empowered itself by skillfully 
propagating this simplified version through bureaucratic and emotional channels and 
ultimately leaving a physical mark on the city’s landscape. Doing so successfully makes the 
Korean American, and increasingly other Asian American, communities more visibly present 
in American public life. Their struggle against a Japanese community that fails to navigate 
American emotional regimes further improves Korean American inclusion within the category 
of authentic Americans.  
While my intention is not to minimize Japan’s historical responsibility for the 
victimization of hundreds of thousands of women, Japan is not the only responsible party for 
the “comfort women” system as it existed during the Japanese empire, nor is it solely 
responsible for the system’s postwar evolutions. As a few of my examples have indicated, the 
close relationship between militaries and sexual slavery did not end with the comfort women 
system in 1945. Allied soldiers in Japan during the postwar occupation, American soldiers in 
Korea ever since the Korean War, and even Korean soldiers during the Korean and Vietnam 
wars all availed themselves of prostitution organizations akin to that of the comfort women. 
Indeed, this phenomenon is not unique to militaries in East Asia; militaries around the world 
engage in similar behavior to this day. The point I believe the comfort women redress 
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movement risks missing by immersing itself in the politics of recognition within an American, 
or any other national, context is ignoring the continued prevalence of sexual slavery in the 
contemporary world. Fixating on whether the Japanese government has “sincerely” apologized 
masks the unsavory fact that the U.S. continues to be a leading consumer of trafficked persons 
for sexual slavery.164 My hope is that, as the redress movement expands across the United 
States and other countries as well, we as members of a transnational society take care not to 
become too distracted by certain details of the past and instead realize that sexual slavery is 
alive and well in the present, and that we all have a responsibility to address it as a problem 
that should shame us all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
July   日 , 2013 
 
Dear City Councilman Frank Quintero and the members of the City Council of Glendale, 
 
I am writing this letter to you on behalf of many concerned Japanese.  
                                                 
164 “Human Trafficking: Modern Enslavement of Immigrant Women in the United States,” American Civil 
Liberties Union, accessed February 24, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/other/human-trafficking-modern-
enslavement-immigrant-women-united-states. 
 104 
 
I learned the news that City Council of Glendale supported the idea of “Comfort Woman” 
Monument in March, and the monument will be unveiled on 30th of July at a public event in 
Central Park.  
 
Recent few years, Korean American’s anti-Japanese propaganda and lobbying become 
extremely active. Korean’s allegation is during WWII the Imperial Armed Forces of Japan 
abducted approximately 200,000 young women and forced them into sexual slavery known as 
“comfort women”. Korean American groups have already put up monuments of comfort 
women in the public properties in NJ and NY. Japanese are upset about this situation. 
 
We do not try to rewrite the history. Also we are not revisionists or right wings. As the 
fabricated history is spreading, we cannot miss damaged our ancestors’ honor, and we want 
you to know the fact what the real history is. 
 
Japanese government and South Korean government authorities jointly conducted a survey on 
comfort women issue in the 1990s. There was no evidence proving participation and forcing 
nature of the Japanese government and the Japanese military other than former comfort 
women’s testimony. “Approximately 200,000 young women were abducted and forced into 
sexual slavery” is not the fact. If you believe this number and abduction as the fact, please 
present reliable primary sources and name the historians which will fully convince we 
Japanese. 
 
Friendly relationship among US, South Korea, and Japan is very important due to stabilization 
for Asia-Pacific region. Because of this anti-Japan propaganda problem, public sentiment got 
worse among all three countries. Then those situations make happy military expansion 
countries and Communist terrorist counties, such as China and North Korea. 
 
We are to cherish and share our growth and prosperity of the region together for years to come. 
Our partnership should never be affected by the phony propaganda. 
I am grateful to you for taking valuable time to read this mail. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
署名(ローマ字 又は 日本語)                     
なまえ（ﾛｰﾏ字）                      
住所（市、県だけでも）                                             
Japan 
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